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Vorwort des Herausgebers 
 
In den vergangenen Jahren wurde von der ethnologischen Forschung die Konstruktion von 
Landschaften in gesellschaftlichen Diskursen deutlich thematisiert. Dabei stand im 
Vordergrund wie Gemeinschaften ihre Identität in die naturräumliche Ausstattung einer 
Region - in Topographien, Vegetation und Hydrologie – einlesen. Entgegen früherer 
kulturökologischer Beschäftigungen mit dem Thema Landschaft stand nun nicht so sehr 
der bio-geophysische Einfluss des Menschen auf seine Umwelt im Vordergrund, sondern 
vor allem wie Landschaften als Medien bei der Konstruktion diverser Identitäten und 
Machtbezüge genutzt werden. Hierbei stehen häufig Landschaftskonstrukte im 
Vordergrund, die sich in einem längeren Traditionsprozess entwickelt haben. 
Landschaftskonstruktionen bezogen u.a. ihre Legitimation durch die historische Tiefe, die 
der Beziehung Mensch/Umwelt anhand konkreter Beispiele zugesprochen wurde. 
Leandros Fischer stellt sich in seiner Magisterschrift, die von Prof. Michael Bollig betreut 
wurde, einer Herausforderung für die ethnologische Landschaftsforschung: 
Flüchtlingslager sind Orte, in denen quasi per definitionem eine Traditionsbildung 
ausgeschlossen wird. Wie entwickeln sich an solchen Orten symbolische 
Ortsbezogenheiten und wie wird die alte und verlorene Heimat in die neue Heimat 
hineinprojeziert und findet ein solcher Verbindungsprozess überhaupt statt? . Fischer 
bearbeitet diese Thematik anhand palästinensischer Flüchtlingslager im Libanon. Seine 
Materialbasis beruht aus einigen gut ausgearbeitete Ethnographien mit deutlichen Bezügen 
zur Thematik und gründet sich weiterhin auf einer umfassenden Lektüre einschlägiger 
historischer Werke sowie auf Propagandamaterial verschiedener palästinensischer 
Organisationen.  
 
Michael J. Casimir 
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1.     Introduction 
 
The issue of the return of the Palestinian refugees remains as controversial as ever. Sixty years 
since the Nakbah and the fate of thousands of refugees gathered in camps of neighbouring Arab 
countries remains undecided. No other issue in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations generates as 
much animosity as the issue of the right of the Palestinians to return. The refugee camps of 
Lebanon have come especially to symbolize the severity of the modern Palestinian experience: 
Expulsion, statelessness, struggle, tragedy and marginalization. Yet, the prospect of the creation of 
a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza appears distant as long as the 
construction of settlements in the West Bank by Israel continues. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
find themselves stranded in a country that for the last 30 years has become the battlefield of 
religious sectarianism, of campaigns for regional domination, and of superpower rivalries. 
 
The Palestinians – in spite of these obstacles – have managed to make their presence felt in the 
academic community; not an easy task, given that up to the late 1960s the world was largely 
oblivious of their existence. This was achieved thanks to the tireless efforts of academics, such as 
the late Edward Said, who fought against the cliché discursive reduction of the Palestinians into 
either fanatic terrorists or passive victims. The fieldwork undertaken in the camps of Lebanon by a 
few dedicated anthropologists has been invaluable to the completion of this thesis1. I have greatly 
benefited from the work of anthropologists such as Rosemary Sayigh, Julie Peteet and Laleh 
Khalili in tracing the time journey of Palestinian camp refugees. This journey affects and is 
affected by global trends such as colonialism, the rise and fall of Third World nationalism, the 
emergence of postcolonial identity and global humanitarian discourse.  
 
To what extent does landscape contribute in the shaping of identity? And how is this manifested? 
As a cognitive component conveyed through nationalist rhetoric, as the provider of livelihood and 
consequently as a social boundary marker, or both?  
 
In the first chapter, a historical overview of the factors that led to the creation of the Palestinian 
refugee problem is undertaken. This covers the years of the emergence of the Zionist movement in 
Palestine, the 1948 War and the Nakbah, the Lebanese political environment as host to the 
Palestinian refugee community leading up to the present. The Zionist project and its colonialist 
                                                
1 Though theoretically possible – anthropoligists are more than welcome in the camps of Lebanon - undertaking 
fieldwork is at present extremely difficult given the recent political developments in Lebanon. 
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character is examined in correlation to the significance of the Romanticist landscape discourse in 
the process of dispossessing the Palestinians. In turn, the Palestinian refugee usage of landscape 
discourse in seeking the establishment of an independent state is also analysed.  
 
The three chapters that then follow are divided into fairly distinct chronological periods. The first 
deals with the experiences of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon after the Nakbah. It concentrates 
on the contradictions of traditional identities that are manifested spatially, with the transforming, 
modernizing effects of a state-like refugee regime. The second centres on the temporary break in 
the relationship between soil and territory that occurred at the time of the PLO’s institutional 
presence in Lebanon, while the third examines the present landscape of the refugee camps, 
focusing on identity forming commemoration sites as well as on the re-emergence of traditional 
forms of identification.  
 
The relationship of the Palestinian refugees with their Lebanese host environment and its 
influence on the camp landscape are also considered. The question of whether the Palestinians of 
Lebanon should be considered as part of a diaspora is raised. To what extent does attachment to 
landscape play a role in classifying the Palestinians in general and camp dwellers in particular as 
part of such a concept? Finally, an outline of the main Palestinian and Israeli arguments for and 
against the Right of Return is also provided. 
 
 
 
2.  Historical Overview 
 
2.1.  From the 1890´s to 1948 
The roots of the Palestinian problem can be traced to the beginnings of the Zionist settler 
movement of the late 19th century. Zionism had developed as a nationalist movement propagating 
the aliyah2 or ascent of the Jewish people to historical Palestine, then part of the ailing Ottoman 
Empire, in light of anti-Semitic pogroms in Eastern Europe, especially Czarist Russia. Up until the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the Zionist movement constituted 
one of many ideologies to be found amongst the Jewish diaspora, coexisting with an array of 
                                                
2 The first aliyah took place between 1882 and 1903 and involved the arrival of 35,000 Jews, mostly from Eastern 
Europe, who established the first Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine (cf. Avineri 1981; Laqueur 1972; Pappé 
2004).  
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others, such as assimilationism and socialism. However, its fortunes were significantly enhanced 
after Britain and France divided among themselves the domains of the dismembered Ottoman 
Empire. Britain obtained a League of Nations mandate3 over Palestine, Transjordan4 and Iraq, 
while France obtained a similar mandate over Syria and what would later become Lebanon. In 
1917, the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, formulated a policy statement – to 
become known as the “Balfour Declaration” – by which Britain had promised a “Jewish national 
home” in Palestine, giving a significant boost to Zionist aspirations for a Jewish state, which by 
now had become more concrete (Pappé 1992: 47). A modus vivendi developed between the 
Zionists and the Mandate authorities, as both had a common enemy in the face of rising anti-
colonial Arab nationalism developing in the region5. Symmetrically, Arab national identity in 
Palestine varied from that in neighbouring countries, as it was marked not only by the desire to rid 
the land of European colonialism, but also from Zionist colonization, which was expanding more 
aggressively after World War I. The second aliyah (1904-1914) had brought as many as 60,000 
new emigrants, which were more committed to political Zionism than the previous settlers (R. 
Khalidi 1997: 94).  
 
Jewish settlers bought land from feudal Arab landowners, forcing the Arab peasants who 
cultivated those lands to flee (R. Sayigh 1979: 39). In addition, the main Jewish labour federation, 
the Histradut, was ensuring that Jewish employers wouldn´t hire Arabs as workers, on grounds 
that these were prepared to work for low wages to which Jews coming from Europe were not 
accustomed (Bernstein 1998; R. Sayigh 1979). Arab dissatisfaction at this situation manifested 
itself in the Great Arab Revolt between 1936 and 1939, which was eventually suppressed by 
20,000 British troops and Zionist militias like the Haganah and the Irgun6. The rise of Nazism in 
Europe, culminating in the horrors of the Holocaust, signalled the dramatic increase in Jewish 
emigration to Palestine; partly because countries such as the United States effectively blocked the 
entry of many European Jews on their soil after the war (Pappé 1992: 21), but primarily due to the 
growing appeal Zionism and its concept of a Jewish state had on the persecuted Jews, now bitterly 
                                                
3 The mandate was granted by the Treaty of Sévres (10.8.1920), although the partition was sealed by the secret Sykes-
Picot agreement, between France, Britain and Russia in 1916, and leaked by the Bolsheviks after their rise to power in 
1917 (Pappé 2004: 66-67). 
4 As present-day Jordan was then known. 
5 Here I am referring to the overall tendency. Jewish-Arab relations were quite more complex and included both 
instances of cooperation and confrontation. 
6 The Haganah was the militia of the Labour Zionist movement, the predecessor of the Israeli Labour Party, while the 
Irgun (officially known as the National Military Organization) was a more underground movement affiliated with the 
right-wing Revisionist Zionist movement, later to become the Herut-party before becoming the present-day Likud-
party. Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was a leading member of the Irgun. 
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disappointed by the nation-states that failed to protect them. Faced with growing Arab discontent, 
the British imposed restrictions on Jews wishing to settle in Palestine. This, of course, backfired as 
the British were now under fire from both Arab and Jewish militias.  
 
2.2.  The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 
As the importance of Palestine for the British Empire declined, following the independence of 
India in 1947, the British prepared to leave. What sets the case of Palestine apart from other cases 
of decolonization however, was the fact that the British did not hand power to indigenous leaders 
(such as Ghandi and Nehru India), but decided instead to refer the issue of Palestine to the United 
Nations. The UN presented the UN Partition Plan for Palestine on the 25th of November 1947, 
which was accepted by the Jews but rejected by the Arabs. The plan provided for the partition of 
Palestine in two, almost equal parts, even though the Jews counted for half of the Arab 
population7 and most had arrived in the years following World War II. The tragedy of the 
Holocaust meant that the case for a Jewish state met with almost unanimous approval in the 
international community8. The fact that one of the key leaders of the Arab resistance to Zionist 
settlement, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Amin Al-Husseini, was a notorious war 
criminal and Nazi-collaborator, did little to generate sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians 
(ibid.: 22-23)9.  
 
On May 14th 1948, just as the British were evacuating Palestine, David Ben Gurion declared the 
independence of the State of Israel. Immediately afterwards, the armies of Egypt, Transjordan, 
Syria and Lebanon attacked to assist the Arabs already fighting the Zionists in Palestine.  Yet the 
Palestinians were unable to pose substantial resistance to the well-organized Jewish militias. Their 
leadership had put it´s faith in the Arab League, whose armies could not be relied upon to engage 
in serious battle (Pappé 1992: 57). At the time the nature of Palestinian society was such that a 
fully-fledged national consciousness had yet to develop. A feudal system from Ottoman times 
existed in much of the countryside, with rural lords living at the expense of peasants (cf. R. Sayigh 
1979; R. Khalidi 1997). Their social status was secured not only by the Sultan (who assigned 
administrative tasks on them), but also on the tribal authority of clans, which in turn was passed 
                                                
7 ca. 660,000 Jews compared to around 1.3 million Arabs. 
8 Not only the Western powers supported the partition plan, but also the Soviet Union, which was chanelling arms to 
the Zionist militias through Czechoslovakia, seeing the establishment of a Jewish state as means to ending the 
existene of a British colony (Pappé 1992: 19-20). 
9 Al-Husseni had fanatically tied his destiny to that of the Axis Powers, erroneously believing that Hitler would win 
the war (Pappé 2004: 119-120).  
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on hereditary. In parallel, an urban elite of merchants existed in the cities, whose influence was 
increasing ever since the European penetration of the Ottoman markets in the 19th century. This 
new elite formed the backbone of the early Palestinian National Movement. But here again clan 
and family loyalties were stronger than national ones10. One consequent factor that further 
explains the Arab defeat of 1948 was the absence of any serious Arab interest in any state-
building during the Mandate era and their dependence on the colonial authorities for the provision 
of services. By sharp contrast the Jews had been building in advance state-like institutions (both 
welfare and military) in anticipation of the British withdrawal (Pappé 1992: 58-60).  
 
The war ended in 1949 with Israel conquering more territory than that provided in the partition 
plan (78% of Mandatory Palestine). The Egyptian and Transjordanian armies only managed to 
place under their control the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which they 
administered until Israel occupied them as well after the Six Day War in 1967. 
 
2.3.  Nakbah and the birth of the refugee problem 
The war created a mass exodus of Palestinians from the lands of the newly founded state of Israel. 
According to the UN, around 711,000 Palestinians left their homes for other Arab countries, while 
160,000 stayed inside the borders of Israel11 during what Palestinians call the Nakbah, or 
catastrophe. While this fact is aknowledged by both sides of the conflict, there is a historical 
debate about the causes of the flight. Official Israeli propaganda had for years proclaimed that 
Palestinians left after being urged to do so by their leaders. The fact that Palestinians didn´t 
possess any documentation of the Nakbah, other than oral history, made it difficult for them to 
present their viewpoint. Only during the late 1980´s with the emergence of the New Historians in 
Israel did it become clear that no such orders were ever given (cf. Morris 1987). The debate 
between historians now shifted to whether the expulsion of Palestinians was part of a “master 
plan” or a by-product of warfare12. The dissident Israeli historian Ilan Pappé argues that the 
Zionist High Command may not have acted upon a plan devised a priori for the eviction of the 
entire Palestinian population, but that the rejection of the UN sanctioned partition plan by the 
Palestinians provided Zionists with the necessary political/diplomatic legitimation to proceed and 
                                                
10 Indeed, relations within the Palestinian community up to the Israeli declaration of independence were marked by 
the vendetta between the Husseini and Nashashibi clans (R. Sayigh 1979: 55). 
11 General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 
covering the period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950 (www.domino.un.org/unispal.nsf). 
12 A Zionist plan for the eviction of Palestinians,“Plan Daleth”, is interpreted by Israeli historians, such as Benny 
Morris, as a purely military plan while Palestinian historians like Walid Khalidi interpret this as a plan with wider 
ideological implications (1988). 
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ethnically cleanse captured territory, benefiting thus from a fait accompli policy (Pappé 1992: 90-
93). The most discussed incident during the Nakbah remains the massacre in the village of Deir 
Yassin between April 9th and April 11th 1948, where the forces of the Irgun massacred between 
100 and 200 civilians. The psychological impact of the massacre was immense, as it dramatically 
accelerated the flight of Palestinians from their lands (ibid.: 96; Morris 1987). 
 
The end of the 1948 war found Palestinians dispersed in refugee camps in Jordan, the West Bank, 
Gaza, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. Those who stayed inside Israel, mainly rural Palestinians, would 
live under martial law until 1966. Israel refused to allow those who were internally displaced to 
return and at the same time destroyed most of their depopulated villages (Boqa´i 1997: 73). To 
this day, Palestinian refugees demand the implementation of UN Resolution 194, which calls for 
the return of Palestinian refugees at the earliest possible date13. 
 
2.4.  Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: facts and figures 
As the Palestinian refugees who fled to other countries had no other citizenship than the expired 
citizenship of the British Mandate of Palestine, their care and protection was not assigned to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)14, but to the newly-created United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).  UNRWA 
is the main provider of services such as education, health and relief to Palestinian refugees. The 
organization defines Palestinian refugees as those whose normal place of residence between June 
1946 and May 1948 was Palestine and whose property and means of livelihood were lost in the 
1948 war, as well as their descendents15. Today, some 4,448,000 Palestinians are registered as 
refugees by UNRWA, 408,438 of them in Lebanon (UNRWA 2006). It should be noted however, 
that the number has been decreasing over the years, since insecurity and unemployment have 
driven many Palestinians out of Lebanon (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 62). Around 220,000 of those 
live in 12 camps, dispersed across Lebanon (see Appendix). The biggest of these camps are Ayn 
al-Hilweh near Sidon with 45,967 registered refugees, Nahr al-Bared near Tripoli with 31,303 
refugees and Rashidiyyeh near Tyre with 29,361 refugees. Palestinians in Beirut live in 4 camps: 
Mar Elias, Burj al-Barajneh, Shatila and Dbayeh.  
                                                
13 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (www.domino.un.org/unispal.nsf). 
14 The UNHCR was created in the aftermath of World War II to accomodate the flow of refugees from Eastern 
Europe. Only refugees with citizenship are eligible for UNHCR aid. The UNHCR differs from UNRWA in the fact 
that the latter is not tasked with the resettlement of refugees, something that would amount to the renounciation of the 
right to return for Palestinians (Akram 2002: 38-39). 
15 www.unrwa-lebanon.org 
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Unlike Jordan, which has given the Palestinians citizenship, the refugees in Lebanon remain 
stateless. And unlike Syria, which has given them the right to work, they are barred from many 
professions, including medicine, law and engineering and as such they are allowed to work only 
menial jobs. They are not allowed to own, buy or sell property and are denied access to the 
country´s health and education systems (Shiblak 1996: 42-44), thus being barred from all spheres 
of public life. This state of affairs does not apply to the relatively small number of upper and 
upper middle class Palestinians who do not reside in the camps and have since acquired Lebanese 
citizenship, having established themselves in banking, tourism, manufacture and imports (R. 
Sayigh 1988: 285). Restrictions have increased in the 1990´s, as the Oslo accords, which 
postponed the issue of return for refugees for future negotiations, opened the possibility of a 
permanent resettlement in Lebanon, something all political factions in the country oppose. The 
refugee camps are constantly presented in the Lebanese media as areas of crime (Lindholm Schulz 
2003: 53-54), or as terrorist hubs, something ostensibly demonstrated by the siege of the Nahr al-
Bared camp in Tripoli in the summer of 2007. The reasons for the social and political 
marginalization of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon must be further sought within the context 
of the long drawn Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990. 
 
2.4.1.  From the Nakbah to 1982 
The Palestinian presence in Lebanon can be categorized in three distinct chronological periods: 
The initial period after the Nakbah (1948-1969), the period between 1969 and 1982, characterized 
by the armed, as well as institutional presence of the PLO (the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization) in Lebanon; and finally, the period since the departure of the PLO until today, a 
period marked by renewed marginalization and insecurity. During the first period between 1948 
and 1968, the Palestinians were confined to the camps, which were closely monitored by the 
Lebanese authorities in order to prevent any political activity. The refugees were viewed as a 
destabilizing factor to the already volatile Lebanese political landscape (R. Sayigh 1979: 102).  
 
2.4.1.1.  The political system of Lebanon  
Although nominally a parliamentary republic, positions in Lebanon´s political system are 
allocated on a sectarian basis. For exmaple, the President must always be a Maronite Christian, the 
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of Parliament a Shia and so on and so forth. Each 
constituency can only be contested by a specific sect during elections, making the growth of non-
confessional political parties virtually impossible. Lebanon as such was transformed into its 
present state since the period of the French mandate by detaching a piece of historical Syria 
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inhabited by a slim majority of Maronites. The Maronite Christians – a Christian sect in 
communion with the Vatican – feel more connected to the West and France in particular, than 
with the rest of the Arab world16. The French had helped design the country’s political system 
explicitly in favour of the Maronites well in advance of Lebanon’s attainment of independence in 
1946. Adding to the undemocratic, sectarian nature of the system was the fact that most of the 
countryside was ruled by zaim (“leaders”), feudal landlords, both Muslim and Christian, with their 
own private armies, who wrested real power in Lebanon and who were singularly determined to 
do all that was deemed necessary to pass on this power to their heirs (Fisk 2001: 75). 
 
2.4.1.2.  The “Fakhani Republic” 
Because the Palestinians were mostly Sunni Muslims, the Lebanese Christian establishment tried 
to prevent them from integrating into society, fearing that the demographic balance could turn 
against them. The 1950s and 1960s saw a change in this demographic balance due to rising 
Christian emigration and higher Muslim birth rates. In conjunction to the failings of the Lebanese 
sectarian system, the Palestinians in 1968 initiated a guerrilla war against Israel, feeling that after 
the Arab defeat of 1967, only they themselves could undertake seriously the task of liberating 
their lands (R. Sayigh 1979).  
 
The Cairo agreement, signed in 1969 between the PLO and Lebanon, gave Palestinians the right to 
attack Israel from within Lebanon and to have an armed presence in the camps. They created their 
own institutions and their new strength meant that the Lebanese army could not disarm them. It 
was a period known as the “Fakhani Republic”, named after the Beirut suburb where the PLO was 
based. This created resentment among the pro-Western Maronite Christian establishment because 
it feared an erosion of its dominance over the country. But the local Muslims saw the Palestinians 
with sympathy, as they felt that a common enemy confronted both. In the wake of the civil war in 
1975, the PLO aligned itself with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a coalition of mostly 
(but not exclusively) Muslim Arab nationalist, communist and socialist parties, which sought to 
get rid of the colonial heritage of an institutionally embedded sectarianism. 
 
Although the causes of the civil war are to be found in the sectarian and class divisions of 
Lebanese society, it was the presence of Palestinians that helped ignite it. On April 13th 1975, the 
                                                
16 The Maronites allied themselves to the Crusaders in the Middle Ages. After the Muslim victory, they retreated to 
the mountains of Lebanon. In 1860, 12,000 Maronites were massacred during a civil war with the Druze until France 
intervened to protect them (Fisk 2001: 56-57).   
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Christian militiamen of the Phalange17 massacred 27 Palestinians travelling on a bus in a Beirut 
suburb. The subsequent destruction of the urban slum of Karantina by Christian forces and the 
siege of the refugee camp Tel al-Za´tar in Beirut on January 1976, were the events that signalled 
the PLO´s entry to the war. During the initial fighting, an LNM victory was viewed as certain. To 
prevent this, the Christians requested Syrian assistance, which in turn sent troops over its border to 
assist them. Syria was constantly irritated by the independence the PLO had shown from Arab 
regimes and was affraid that events in Lebanon could spread over the border (Fisk 2001: 83). Its 
intervention helped prevent victory for the LNM and the Palestinians. However,  the ever-shifting 
alliances within Lebanon and in the region as a whole meant that the war was far from over. The 
Phalange was beginning to develop military links with Israel, something Syria disliked. This 
resulted in an alliance between Syria and the LNM. In 1978, Israel invaded the south of Lebanon 
in retaliation for PLO attacks across the border. And in 1982, Israel invaded again, occupying one 
third of the country. 
 
2.4.2.  Renewed insecurity 
 
2.4.2.1.  The Shatila massacre 
Israel invaded Lebanon after the attempted murder of its ambassador in London18. Israeli forces 
managed to reach Beirut in the summer of 1982 and, after an agreement in which the United 
States provided security guarranties for the refugees in the camps, the PLO departed from the 
country. This left the refugee population effectively unprotected now that PLO fighters were gone. 
In September, the designated president of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated. Although 
the murderer was a follower of a pro-Syrian Lebanese party, suspicion fell upon the Palestinians. 
On September 16th, Israeli soldiers stationed at the outer limits of the Shatila camp, allowed 
Phalange gunmen to enter the camp to massacre Palestinian refugees, which, depending on the 
sources, slaughtered between 700 and 3,500 civilians. The Israeli troops provided the vital 
logistical support for the militiamen to accomplish their mission (Siegel & Barbee 1983; Shahid 
2002). The news of the massacre produced an international outcry, and about 400,000 Israelis 
protested in Tel Aviv, demanding explanations. A subsequent Israeli inquiry into the killings 
                                                
17 The Phalange, or kataeb, was an extremely right-wing Maronite movement influenced by European fascism. It was 
founded after its founder Pierre Gemayel had visited Nazi Germany during the 1936 Olympics. It was modeled on 
Franco´s Phalange in Spain and was hostile to pan-Arabism and the Palestinian presence in the country. (Fisk 2001: 
65-66).  
18 The attempt was carried out by the Abu Nidal group, which had long split from the PLO. 
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found defence minister Ariel Sharon ultimately responsible and recommended that he should 
never hold public office again19. 
 
2.4.2.2.  The War of the Camps 
The withdrawal of the PLO left the refugees vulnerable to outside attacks. They now faced 
growing hostility from another segment of Lebanese society: the Shia Muslims. The Shia were 
always over-represented at the bottom layers of society. The fact that many of the refugee camps 
were located in the slum areas predominantly populated by Shias meant that the relations between 
the two communities had been very close and friendly  – the Palestinians were even able to 
provide welfare services to the Shia poor at the peak of PLO influence in Lebanon (Peteet 2005: 
135).  But divisions emerged in the south of Lebanon as many religious Shia felt offended by the 
behaviour of the predominantly secular Palestinians, giving rise to anti-Palestinian sentiment 
among their community. The Islamic revolution in Iran further strengthened the confidence of the 
Shia and, since the PLO left in 1982, their two main organizations, Amal and Hizbullah, became 
the dominant factions in Muslim West Beirut. Whereas Hizbullah had an Islamist agenda and 
refrained from attacking the camps, Amal tried to assert itself on a communitarian rather than a 
religious basis20. As the prospect of an overthrow of the sectarian system became more distant, 
sectarianism remained the only way of gaining access to state resources. Consequently, Amal tried 
prove its national credentials by blaming, as the right-wing Christians did, the Palestinians for the 
disintegration of the country (ibid.: 153-154). This desire to be included in mainstream Lebanese 
nationalism resulted in the War of the Camps in the mid-80´s, during which Amal attacked the 
camps, causing hundreds of civilian casualties among the Palestinians.  
 
2.4.2.3.  The end of the civil war and the Cedar Revolution  
The end of the civil war in 1990 found Lebanon under Syrian hegemony. The refugee camps 
continued to be places of confinement, guarded by Lebanese and Syrian army checkpoints. In the 
post-war climate, the marginalization of the Palestinians is viewed as one of the few elements of 
Lebanese national cohesion (R. Sayigh 1995: 37). As the centre of gravity of Palestinian 
resistance shifted from the Diaspora to the Occupied Territories, refugee camp residents in 
Lebanon felt abandoned and betrayed by the official PLO leadership which had deferred the issue 
                                                
19 For a detailed description of the events (although still lacking in many ways) see the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (The Kahan Commission), 8 February 1983 
(http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html). 
20 For the different political approaches of the Lebanese Shia regarding Palestinians, see the interview of Hizbullah´s 
spiritual leader, Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (1988). 
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of their Return until further notice (ibid.: 41). Following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops, the “cedar revolution” of 2005 did little to improve the 
Palestinian’s condition. On the contrary, it now became more vulnerable as Palestinians were to 
be viewed as Syrian agents, or worse, as Al Qaida sympathisers21. Under the guise of to the “War 
on Terror”, the Lebanese army virtually destroyed the Nahr al-Bared camp in 2007, to root out 
Fatah al-Islam, an until then little known and, allegedly, Palestinian Islamist group22.  
 
 
 
3.  Zionism and the Transformation of the Palestinian Landscape 
 
3.1.  The nature of the conflict 
The landscape of Palestine has been for long a terrain upon which different ideological visions 
were projected. The Crusaders were the first to establish a cognitive topography of Palestine 
during their invasions, based on biblical descriptions. In more recent times, Zionism dramatically 
transformed the Palestinian landscape in order to establish a Jewish state. It did so, as it stemmed 
from the 19th century European tradition of Romantic nationalism, in which notions of landscape 
and nation are closely intertwined. The Palestinians of the mid-20th century, mostly peasants 
attached to their local identities, possessed no comparable vision to counter Zionist assertions. 
These would only later develop in the refugee camps, and here the absence of the concrete 
experience of the landscape resulted in deterritorialized and universalistic perceptions of 
Palestinianness. 
 
By considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as primarily national in character rather than 
religious, the phenomenon of nationalism and its relationship to the landscape must be addressed. 
Here I will focus on secular Zionism, a defining marker of Palestinian identity in the camps of 
Lebanon, and on secular Palestinian nationalism. These ideologies, both secular Zionism and 
secular Palestinian nationalism, are connected to European colonialism: the first as its offshoot 
and the second as a response to it. In contrast, political Islam and religious Zionism pursue a 
                                                
21 “Old fears haunt Lebanon camps”, BBC, March 26 2005 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4376545.stm) 
22 The American journalist Seymour Hersh who revealed the My Lai massacre and the tortures in Abu Graib, claims 
that the militants are not Palestinians but foreign Sunni extremists who found refuge in the camps and who are 
indirectly funded by Saudi Arabia in an attempt to curb the influence of the pro-Iranian Hizbullah in Lebanon. 
(http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh) 
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substantially different agenda23. Their emphasis on the Muslim or Jewish holiness of the land is 
more in line with notions of locations imbued with spiritual power (Colson 1997). Secular 
Zionism and Palestinian nationalism share a European-inspired vision of landscape. Landscape art 
of the Romantic period discloses much about the background of this vision. Landscape poetry was 
utilized to boost national identity, as was the case with German nationalism (Bollig, in press). 
While depictions of wild settings in paintings are understood to represent the bourgeois Self living 
in civilization, they are also meant as an “antidote to modernity” (Luig & Von Oppen 1997: 11-
12). This ambivalent relationship to the modern world is for example evident in the construction 
of the Palestinian peasant as a national symbol. 
 
The politics of landscape in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not an abstraction, but an ongoing 
reality. In this chapter I will try to present a synopsis of the political economy of Zionism and its 
consequent impact on the landscape, as well as on the Palestinian ideological response to it. 
 
3.1.1.  Zionism as a colonization movement 
Zionism developed as a direct response to the anti-Semitism that emerged in the “enlightened” 
European societies of the 19th century. It was anti-Semitism in these societies that inspired the 
Zionist visions of the movement’s founding father. According to Theodor Herzl, the Jews could 
not rely on liberal democratic societies for their protection and should therefore seek to form a 
separate state of their own (Avineri 1981: 92-94)24. Like all nationalist mythologies, Zionism had 
a three-fold structure: An imagined golden age, a national tragedy and a glorious resurgence 
(Kedouri 1993). For the early Zionists, the national tragedy lay in the Diaspora, which was 
condemned as morally degrading and intolerable for all self-respecting Jews (Laqueur 1972: 591). 
Because life in the Diaspora was viewed as defined by persecution and hollow commercialism, 
Zionism also offered assurances to personal renewal (Selwyn 1995: 116). The aim of founding a 
state for the Jews led to the consideration of various geographical locations, including Uganda 
(Avineri 1981: 110). Palestine was ultimately chosen because of the role the Bible played in 
keeping alive the Jewish identity while in the Diaspora.  
                                                
23 Like in the Northern Ireland conflict, there is a misconception amongst both supporters and detractors of Zionism, 
that the conflict is religious in nature. Hence the supporters propagate the idea of a “Jewish state” while the detractors 
the idea of a single “secular democratic state for Muslims, Christians and Jews”. As in many other colonization 
processes, Zionism resulted in the emergence of a new nation, the Israeli nation, with its own distinct language and 
secular culture. The conflict can thus be summarized as one between two nations: the Israeli and the Palestinian-Arab. 
24 Herzl was working as a correspondent in France for the Austrian Neue Freie Presse when the Dreyfus Affair broke 
out, a scandal about a Jewish army officer, Alfred Dreyfus, who allegedly passed secrets to the Germans. The affair 
exposed the widespread anti-Semitism present in French society (cf. Avineri 1981; Laqueur 1972). 
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The fact that Zionism wished to establish a state in a spatial location already inhabited by another 
people classified it, for all intents and purposes, as a colonization movement25. It remains so to 
this day, in the form of the state of Israel (Machover 2006: 4). Since the fall of Apartheid in South 
Africa, Israel is last remaining example of active colonization. This is partly due to the fact that its 
project was launched relatively late in time (Machover, personal communication; Laqueur 1972: 
593). Colonization is still in progress in the form of Jewish settlement in the West Bank, the 
systematic seizure of land that belongs to Israel´s Palestinian citizens and the enforcement of the 
Law of Return26.  
 
However, the Israeli case differs in some respects from other colonizing processes. A feature that 
sets it apart is that unlike South Africa, the United States or Australia, the Jewish colonists did not 
enjoy the protection of a host major military power. Because of their weakness in this respect, 
Zionist leaders sought from the beginning to forge an alliance with a great power. Herzl summed 
up the position: 
For Europe, we would form there [in Palestine] part of the rampart against Asia, serving as 
an outpost of civilization against barbarism. As a neutral State, we would remain in contact 
with all of Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence. (Theodor Herzl 1896, Der 
Judenstaat, quoted in Machover 2006: 10) 
 
This alliance was not a matter of choice, but of necessity. While Palestine was still under Ottoman 
rule, Herzl tried unsuccessfully to gain the backing of the German Kaiser, who was then allied to 
the Sultan (Laqueur 1972: 100-112; Machover 2006: 11). Britain took over the role of protector of 
the area after 1917, to be followed by the United States after the end of World War II. The unique 
relationship between Zionism and the West was confirmed during the first 17 years of Israel’s 
existence, when the inflow of capital from Western countries was greater by 6 billion dollars to its 
total outflow. Most notably, the main bulk of foreign investment in the country was directed 
towards non-profit making projects, such as free housing (Machover and Orr 1969). 
 
Since the Six Day War of 1967, the United Sates have become Israel’s chief strategic ally. By 
2005, Israel received for that single financial year 2,202,240,000 dollars in military aid and 
                                                
25 This is not a moral judgement but an indeniable fact; to claim that colonization was in this case acceptable or 
otherwise, is a moral judgement, from which I refrain. 
26 The law states that any person who can prove Jewish descent has the right to emigrate to Israel. 
(http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws) 
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357,120,000 dollars in economic assistance, all in the form of grants27. In an unstable oil-rich 
region the United States were serviced in exchange by a stable ally, capable of shielding Western 
interests28 from Arab nationalist challenges. Access to war-experienced Israeli military know-how 
and the testing of American military hardware in combat are additional benefits for the United 
States, resulting from this close relationship (Machover 2006: 27-30)29. 
 
3.1.2.  Zionism as an example of non-exploitative colonization 
Settler societies can be classified in accordance to whether the labour of the native population is 
exploited or not. In this respect, Israel is often wrongly compared to Apartheid South Africa. The 
settlers in South Africa exploited the black population as a cheap labour force during the 
expansion of mining and industry, thus establishing the Bantustans30, while denying the 
indigenous population basic civil and human rights31. However, in the case of Palestine, the native 
inhabitants were not utilized in any manner whatsoever (Swedenburg 1990: 19). Zionism, with its 
explicit aim of “redeeming” the Jews, envisioned a society of workers and peasants. This could 
not have been achieved if the settlers employed Palestinian labour, irrespective of how much 
cheaper it may have been. Although in the early years of settlement the Arab peasants and the 
Bedouins were perceived as authentic residents of the Land of the Bible (Selwyn 1995: 117), the 
Palestinians were to be barred from the settler economy and marginalized to the point of being 
forced to leave, a process described in Zionist literature as “transfer” (cf. Machover 2006)32. 
Herzl, for instance, notes in his diaries: 
[the Jewish settlers] should try to spirit the penniless population across the border by 
procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our 
own country. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried 
out discreetly and circumspectly. (1960: 343) 
 
                                                
27 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for the Year 2006 
(http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/) 
28 See for example the Suez campaign where Israel sided with Britain and France to attack Egypt because of the 
latter’s nationalization of the Suez canal, or, more relevant to the subject matter of this thesis, Israel’s role in installing 
a pro-Western Christian government in Beirut in 1982 (cf. Pappé 2004). 
29 This form of relationship has inspired many theories, often anti-Semitic, but also academic in origin, like the recent 
controversial book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy by political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen 
Walt, which claims that a powerful pro-Israeli lobby forces the U.S. to act against its own interests. In fact, it seems 
that the U.S. and not Israel is the foremost beneficiary in this relationship. 
30 “Independent” black mini-states, recognized only by the Apartheid regime and acting as sources of cheap labour. 
31 In the exploitative model of colonization, the conflict often assumes the form of overt class struggle while in the 
exclusionist model that of a national struggle (Machover 2006: 19). 
32 The period after 1967 was an exception, as thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza did not flee as 
in 1948, but remained put to their lands, commuting daily to Israel for work. With the outbreak of the first Intifada in 
1987, Israel imposed work restrictions and brought many “guest-workers”, mostly from Asia, to replace the 
Palestinians (Pappé 2004: 204-205). 
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This, in itself, was no paradox. As a movement originating from 19th century Europe, Zionism 
reflected the evolutionist perceptions of the time: European Jews represented progress, while Arab 
Palestinians were viewed as irrelevant and coming from another time (Bowman 1993: 74). This 
view of the Palestinians contributed to the makeup of the pre-1948 Israeli identity. As in most 
cases of nation building, the Israeli national self-identity was enhanced through the construction of 
an internal Other. The universalizing capacity of nationalism is in itself insufficient for state 
formation; it has to be complemented by ethnicity – a particularizing project within the process of 
state formation, which produces an order of imagined peoplehoods – where each ethnicity is 
assigned to a different hierarchical rank (Alonso 1994: 390-391). The identity of the dominant 
ethnic group is located at the core of the imagined community, and is therefore privileged (cf. 
Gilroy 1987). This holds true of present day Israel, where approximately 20% of its citizens are 
Palestinians. This two way process of inclusion and exclusion continues to have a profound 
impact on the Palestinian landscape, both within Israel and in the Occupied Territories. 
 
3.2.  Zionist landscape discourse: “To make the desert bloom” 
A correlation exists between human emotions, national identity and particular features of the 
landscape (Bollig, in press). As such, “making the desert bloom” was one of the most important 
slogans advanced by the Zionist movement. A revived landscape had to be viewed in conjunction 
with the resurging Jewish national identity. The three-fold structure of nationalist myth 
construction would be of relevance in this particular instance too.  
 
A Zionist thinker of the early settler period, Aharon David Gordon, was a major influence on the 
kibbutz movement. Central to his ideas was that manual labour could be the means to personal and 
national redemption. He rejected urban culture, a key feature of Jewish life in the Diaspora, and 
propagated the superiority of agrarian life, in correspondence to the late 19th century neo-
Romantic mood in Europe (Avineri 1981: 151-152). He wrote in 1911: 
Our people can be brought to life only if each one of us re-creates himself though labour and 
a life close to nature. This is how we can, in time, have good farmers, good labourers, good 
Jews and good human beings (Gordon 1911, “Some Observations”, quoted in Avineri 1981: 
153) 
 
These ideas survive in Israel to the present day. To give just one example, the Society for the 
Preservation of Nature in Israel (SPNI) is a state-sponsored society that organizes nature tours to 
bring young Israelis in touch with the features of the natural landscape. Close contact with the 
landscape and its conservation are central to Zionist ideology. These are understood as a unifying 
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factor and as a way of shielding the nation from both internal discord and external threats (Selwyn 
1995: 131).  
 
As anticipated, these ideas came in direct conflict with the Palestinians inhabiting this landscape. 
Therefore, the presence of the Palestinians had to be negated, as demonstrated by Golda Meir’s 
famous saying that “there isn’t such thing as the Palestinians” (quoted in Said 1984: 31). This is 
not to imply that the Zionists claimed that Palestine was empty of people at the time of their 
arrival in the late 1890s. Rather, the Arab identity was considered as either deterritorialized and 
nomadic (Peteet 2005: 42) or possessing an emotional attachment only to a defined place (a 
village or a house); and incapable therefore of exhibiting affinity towards any notion of a 
homeland (Benvenisti 2000: 246). Given that the Arab lands were extensive, it was further 
understood that the Palestinian Arabs would have few difficulties in relocating to other 
neighboring Arab countries. Ultimately, due to its presumed detachment from the landscape, 
Palestinian nationalism was deemed inferior to Zionism. Nationhood requires, after all, the 
existence of a direct relationship between a people and its culture on the one hand, and a 
geographically specific territory on the other (Peteet 2005: 43). In the SPNI landscape tours, the 
Arabs feature only as either invading soldiers, rich landlords, or as dark ghostlike presences on the 
hillsides, unworthy to comment upon (Selwyn 1995: 122). 
 
In order to further justify its claim to the land, Zionism had also to redefine the period between its 
emergence and the Jewish presence during Biblical times, both in and outside Palestine33. This 
resulted in negative representations of life in the Diaspora. Parallel to that, Palestine was depicted 
as a wasteland (Peteet 2005: 37)34. The Palestinian’s treatment of the land was marked by gross 
underdevelopment and stagnation, in contrast to the Zionist who strived to “make the desert 
bloom”, a view resembling Western colonial depictions of the African landscape as one “waiting” 
to become recognizable through acquisition or “protection” (Luig & Von Oppen 1997: 20). 
Ultimately, the argument concludes, since the Palestinians are incapable of developing the land, 
they do not deserve to possess it (Peteet 2005: 41).  
 
Based on the treatment of the landscape, the introduction by Israel of the Black Goat Law of 1975 
is a good example of how the Other was to be kept out. This law restricted the areas on which the 
                                                
33 For example, the Museum of the Diaspora in Tel-Aviv gives the visitor the impression that no matter how glorious, 
life in the Diaspora will always be marked by persecution (Selywn 2001: 231). 
34 Julie Peteet notes that in Israeli excavations in Jerusalem, the term “recent periods” is employed to address a period 
spanning from the early Islamic era to the Ottoman times, ca. 1,300 years (2005: 39). 
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Bedouins were allowed to graze their goats, allegedly to forestall harmful overgrazing. This, in 
conjunction with the establishment of a paramilitary “Green Patrol”, aimed at physically 
compelling the Bedouins to flee from rural areas and join urbanized settlements. This was 
perceived as a thinly veiled attempt to further appropriate Arab lands (Abu-Sa´ad 1997: 132; 
Selwyn 1995: 128).  
 
The perception of Arab place as backward, as well the association of the Palestinians with violent 
features of the natural landscape, are still to be encountered in contemporary Israeli political 
discourse. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak compared the Middle East to a “jungle” and the 
Occupied Territories to a “swamp”35, while the slain Israeli Tourism Minister, Rehavam Ze´evi, 
had once referred to Palestinians working illegally in Israel as “lice”36. 
 
3.2.1.  “Trapped minority”: The Palestinian citizens of Israel  
The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories on the one hand and Israeli Palestinians on the other 
experience the transformation of the landscape in a quite different way. By contrast to the 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the Israeli Palestinians enjoy full civic and individual 
rights (more than the citizens of any Arab country). However, they are denied national collective 
rights, something that keeps them vulnerable in a state that explicitly defines itself as Jewish 
above all else (Zreik 2003: 46). As a result, even though Israeli Palestinians have the right to vote, 
their participation in elections is not motivated by a desire to influence decisions but rather to elect 
Arab representatives who would simply “tell the truth” about their plight from within parliament 
(Rabinowitz 1994: 32).  
 
Other than those who managed to remain in their ancestral homes, within the Israeli borders there 
are to be found Palestinians internally displaced who are denied the right to return to their 
villages37. In addition, around one tenth of Israeli Palestinians live in so-called “unrecognized 
villages” not listed as Arab localities by the authorities, which do not have any basic infrastructure 
(Lindholm Schulz 2003: 77). Their inhabitants are exposed to the danger of being summarily 
evicted (Cook 1997: 200). The state of emergency under which Palestinians had lived ended 
                                                
35 “Veteran Israeli Hawk Tries out Wings of a Dove”, New York Times, May 21, 1996 
(http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE3DD1039F932A15756C0A960958260) 
36 “Israeli minister assassinated”, The Guardian, October 17, 2001 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/17/israel2) 
37 These are the so-called “present absentees”. Israeli law prevents any Palestinians who fled the Nakbah from 
returning to their homes, regardless if they relocated to other Arab countries or within Israel (Masalha 1997: 13). 
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officially in 1966. Yet certain aspects of it have remained in place as Israel persists to legislate for 
the continued confiscation of land, to be used by Jewish newcomers, thus also further reducing the 
prospects of return for the Palestinian displaced (Masalha 1997: 25). 
 
Zionism radically transformed the previously Arab landscape. The linguistic kinship of Arabic and 
Hebrew made the change of place names an easier task than usual. For instance, the village of Al-
Bassa became Betzet, Saffuriyah became Tzippori and so forth (Benvenisti 2000: 17-19). New 
names and mapping corresponded well with Foucault’s notion that knowledge equals power. Most 
of the Palestinians who stayed within Israel after 1948 are concentrated in the north of the country. 
Many live in scattered and isolated villages, something that hindered the ability to forge a 
coherent identity (Rabinowitz 2001: 67). Memories of the Nakbah constitute the most significant 
group solidarity factor. As a consequence, Arab landmarks pre-dating 1948, like mosques and 
churches, are viewed as disturbing reminders of defeat (ibid. : 75).  
 
Even people who remain in their ancestral homes find the connection between space and place 
broken (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 38). As the pattern of rural Palestinian life is being disrupted, 
the continuing decline in the size of Arab land produces amongst Israeli Palestinians the feeling of 
being suffocated, of being found stuck in time, thus leading to an identity crisis (Rabinowitz 2001: 
67). Israeli Palestinians are what Rabinowitz defines as a “trapped minority”, a minority whose 
entrapment begins at the historical moment which the dominant group associates with victory, 
which remainins non-assimilated (either by choice or rejection by the dominant group, or both), 
and which displays chronic ideological and internal divisions due to its structural position between 
the host state and the mother nation (ibid.: 72-77). The Israeli Palestinians find themselves altering 
between different political options, including co-option by the state, political separation and 
Islamism. However, their most preferred option remains the struggle for equal national rights in 
Israel along with the affirmation of their Palestinian identity. For this reason they tend mostly to 
vote for Arab parties or for the non-Zionist Communist Party of Israel (cf. Pappé 2004; 
Rabinowitz 1994). 
 
For the Israeli Palestinians the spatial separation from those living in the Occupied Territories or 
in the Diaspora has traumatic consequences. It has held them back from developments in their 
national identity (an aspect also examined in this thesis), something that has at times generated 
their portrayal of them by their compatriots as Zionist collaborators (Rabinowitz 2001: 74). 
However, a demonstration against land confiscation in March 30 1976, known as “Land Day”, 
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during which six Israeli Palestinians were killed (Masalha 1997: 32), led to a reinvigorated 
national awareness and active solidarity with their fellow Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories38.  
 
This newly found awareness of the Palestinian citizens has alarmed the Israeli political 
establishment, which in recent years has reaffirmed the Jewish character of the state and 
encouraged the proliferation of the “demographic threat” argument to the existence of Israel due to 
high Arab birth rates. This was complemented by restrictions on the civic rights of Palestinians, 
exemplified by the automatic annulment of parliamentary immunity for the Arab members of the 
Knesset as soon as they dare question the Jewish character of the state. (Rouhana & Sultany 2003: 
12). 
 
3.2.2.  The landscape of the Occupation 
Zionist politics have a notably different effect on the Palestinians of the West Bank and – until 
recently – of Gaza. Whereas the state in Israel is trying to transform previously Arab place, it is 
trying to separate itself from it in the Occupied Territories by all means available. This is best 
symbolized by the construction of the fence “separating”39 the West Bank from Israel as well as 
by the by-pass roads that connect Israel to the settlements. Biblical archaeology plays a crucial 
role as excavations are anticipated to legitimize Jewish claims to the land (Weizman 2007: 39-41). 
Especially for the religious Zionist movements, the West Bank is a conceptualized landscape, one 
characterized by powerful religious meanings found in nature rather than within material culture 
or monuments (Ashmore & Knapp 1999: 11). 
 
3.2.2.1.  Settlements 
The building of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza began almost immediately after the Israeli 
victory in the Six Day War. These were initially erected along the frontier with Jordan in order to 
give the population of pre-67 Israel an early warning in case of attack (McGarry 1998: 616). This 
model was mostly associated with the Labour Zionist movement where security considerations 
were foremost. The Revisionist Zionist movement preferred to construct settlements near places of 
biblical importance (Pappé 2004: 203). Approaches to settlement buildings were also divided 
                                                
38 During a demonstration to show solidarity with the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, Israeli police shot dead 13 Palestinian 
citizens of Israel (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 78). 
39 “Separating” is the definiton used by the Israeli government. However, the fence´s course incorporates important 
pieces of Arab land to pre-67 Israel, including East Jerusalem, the establishment of which, as the capital of a 
Palestinian state is key demand of the PLO. 
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among governmental and non-governmental actors such as the Gush Emunim religious settler 
movement. The latter organized so-called “ascents”, expeditions on hilltops in the West Bank 
before building settlements on them, to “regenerate the soul” and “achieve personal and national 
renewal” (Weizman 2007: 89). After construction was completed, settlements were typical 
examples of “gated communities”, marked by a fear of the Outside, while symbolizing segregation 
and exclusionary land use practices (Low 2001). The confiscation of land to build these 
settlements was justified with security arguments or with reference to the Ottoman Land Law of 
1858, which transferred the ownership of land if continuously uncultivated by the owner for ten 
years or more (Weizman 2007: 117). 
 
3.2.2.2.  By-pass roads 
By-pass roads link this network of settlements with Israel as well as with one another. These 
inscriptions on the landscape are a striking symbol of power with a dual function. The first is to 
allow settlers and their visitors to travel without having to pass through Palestinian towns. The 
second is to serve military purposes. A network of checkpoints and video cameras along the roads 
ensure that the Palestinians remain “invisible” to travelers (Selwyn 2001: 228-229). The roads 
have “hollowed out” the Palestinian landscape as they often pass through, in tunnels under or 
bridges over Palestinian settlements. Such for example is the road from Tel Aviv to the settlement 
of Modi´in, which is trailed on both sides by high concrete walls, painted with idealized images of 
the surrounding landscape (Weizman 2007: 181). As these roads slice the West Bank into many 
pieces, they will also have an important political implication in the negotiating process for the 
creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank: they divide the land and split the Palestinians 
from another. In short, the settlements and the roads have created an alternative landscape, “new 
realities on the ground”, which further complicate the creation of a Palestinian sovereign state. 
Some symbolic functions have been attributed to this road network. Selwyn for instance notes that 
notions of open borders and free movement have been negatively received in Israel and are often 
associated with vulnerability and terrorist attacks. Separation from the Arab landscape is therefore 
seen as embodying security (2001). 
 
3.2.2.3.  The Separation Fence 
Undoubtedly, the most famous symbol of the impact of occupation on the Palestinian landscape is 
the Fence or Wall separating Israel and Jewish settlements from Palestinian territory. Probably the 
most expensive construction project in the state’s history (costing more than 3 billion dollars), the 
Separation Fence is concrete-build, 8-meters high and incorporates electronic fences, barbed wire, 
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radar, cameras, deep trenches, observation posts and patrol roads. The construction of the Fence 
began in 2002 and its route has been an important source of contention among different lobby 
groups, such as religious settlers, Palestinian peasants, human rights and environmentalist groups. 
Due to a variety of political pressures, the Fence’s path has been redirected several times 
(Weizman 2007: 161-162). 
 
The Israeli state presented the Fence as a temporary measure and justified its construction by 
advancing security concerns, particularly the growing number of suicide bomber attacks. 
However, the Fence has produced realities that seem far more permanent. The most striking of 
these is the creation of extraterritorial islands of Palestinian settlements to west of the Fence, 
“closed military zones” within it, and around a hundred Jewish settlements to the east of the 
Fence, rendering traditional perceptions of political space as a “contiguous territorial surface” 
irrelevant (ibid.: 167).  
 
3.3.  Palestinian reactions: landscape discourse 
Faced with such policies, Palestinian nationalist rhetoric has placed great emphasis on landscape. 
In the past, national liberation movements in the Third World tended to adopt Western-inspired 
national narratives. The resemblance of the Palestinian nationalist landscape representations with 
those emanating from the Romanticist era (or, for that matter, from Zionist narratives) is most 
remarkable. The correspondence of such narratives to modernity is ambivalent to say the least. 
Like any other colonial movement, Zionism brought with it not only occupation and oppression 
but also a modernizing transformation of traditional life. This was particularly true during the 
period when the West Bank depended economically on Israel, both as a market for its goods and a 
source of cheap labour (between 1967 and the First Intifada), leading to the proletarianization of 
many Palestinians.  
 
The PLO, a typical Third World liberation movement with a middle class leadership, evoked the 
ideal of rural life as a rallying cry against Israeli occupation. This involved an eclectic 
reconstruction of the rural past. The muktar (village headman) and the veil were excluded from the 
vision of the prospective state. Instead a modern integrated economy, based on agriculture and 
industry, was envisioned. Yet again, the economic transformation resulting from the Occupation 
has led to a renewed idealization of rural life, expressed through folk art and by the wish to rescue 
tradition. The artistic expressions of Palestinian rural life suggest liberation through the “return” to 
a utopian past of pastoral serenity, where humanity and nature are in complete harmony to each 
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other. Paintings of villages by West Bank artists show stone-and-mud dwellings immaculately 
blending with the rolling hills. Village society is reconstructed as if classless and functioning 
through a moral economy that supersedes capitalist development (Swedenburg 1990: 21-24) 
 
3.3.1.  Nature as part of the struggle 
In the official Palestinian nationalist discourse, the land has been objectified by the map of historic 
Palestine and has been ascribed with human qualities: it can be patient and sad but also rebellious 
and vengeful (Linholm Schulz 2003: 127.). The map of Palestine has been also used as a symbol. 
The logo of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) shows a map with an arrow 
pointing out of Palestine, symbolizing the expulsion of the Palestinians, and another pointing 
towards it, symbolizing the return to the homeland (Bisharat 1997: 218). It was fashionable in the 
camps of Lebanon in the 70s to wear necklaces of miniature maps of Palestine (Peteet 2005: 150). 
Trees and plants have also been imbued with nationalist (i.e. mythical) connotations. As regular 
features of the Palestinian landscape, the cactus and the olive tree have come to symbolize the 
persistence of the Palestinians to remain attached to their land. The cactuses that have sprung up in 
the deserted houses and villages abandonded after the Nakbah, led to naratives of how the cactus 
always springs back to life – even after Israeli settlers had try to burn it on the ground 
(Swedenburg 1990: 22). 
 
Apart from plants, natural phenomena have also been used in nationalist discourse, like 
hurricanes, typhoons, volcanoes, thunderbolts and earthquakes and as a norm are depicted in 
alliance with the Palestinian struggle40.  
 
Then again, in order to emphasize the closeness between land and people, the land is usually 
feminized, for the Palestinian martyr (shaheed)41 to come to the rescue. Martyrdom is not a feature 
unique to Islamism; it occurs also in secular Palestinian nationalism. Only the martyr through his 
spilled blood is eternally reunited with the land (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 129-130).  
 
 
 
                                                
40 The pro-Syrian organization within the PLO for example is called al-Saiqa (thunderbolt) and Fatah´s military wing 
was called al-Asifa (storm). 
41 The term “martyr” doesn´t only apply to suicide bombers but also to every Palestinian that is killed in a war, be it a 
civilian caught in the crossfire or a fighter. 
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3.3.2.  The peasant: from agent to signifier 
Because of the largely rural character of Palestinian society before the Nakbah, the peasant, or 
fellah, was chosen as an inclusive and mobilizing symbol of resistance, the embodiment of 
struggle. As a middle-class movement trying to mobilize the masses, the PLO fashioned the 
peasant to a unifying symbol representing, along with the fighter (feday), the authentic Palestinian. 
The worker was carefully avoided since the appearance of that class symbolized defeat and 
neocolonial dependence on the Israeli economy (Sweedenburg 1990: 18). 
 
Yet in order to serve the cause of a middle-class movement, the peasant had to be reconstructed. 
The Great Arab Revolt of 1936-39 saw the peasants being at the forefront of the struggle against 
British colonialism and Zionist land expropriation (cf. R. Sayigh 1979). The PLO stripped the 
peasantry off its capacity as a historical agent with subversive capabilities and distinct class 
interests. While being a peasant before 1948 was a symptom of backwardness for the Palestinian 
middle class, the redefined fellah was to be a national signifier, steadfast (sumud) in the insistence 
to stay put on the land of the fathers (Swedenburg 1990: 18-20). This must be seen bearing in 
mind Zionist efforts to present the Palestinians as a nomadic people lacking attachment to the 
landscape.  
 
The contradictions found in the Palestinian national discourse became subtler but were not 
eliminated. In the rhetoric of the PLO the leadership in exile, symbolized by the fedayeen, 
conducts the national struggle. The task of the peasant is to remain in Palestine and resist attempts 
of expulsion. The leadership of the struggle is seen as acting on their behalf.  
 
However, this situation has changed in recent years for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the 
establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the 1990´s ended the dichotomy 
between Homeland and Exile in the national struggle. On the other hand, following the Intifada, 
Israel imposed more and more restrictions on Palestinians working inside Israel, leading to high 
levels of unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza. Recent years have also witnessed peasants 
actively opposing Zionist policies such as land expropriation and the construction of the 
Separation Fence (Weizman 2007: 171), often joining hands with activists on the Israeli side of 
the divide. 
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4.  Landscape and Identity: ayaam al-UNRWA  
Tent no. 50, on my left, is my new world 
Rashid Hussein, Palestinian poet.  
 
In this chapter an account of the circumstances of the refugees immediately after the Nakbah and 
up to the establishment of PLO institutions will be attempted. Since there is a significant shortage 
of data on the early experiences of the Palestinians in Lebanon, let alone any ethnographic 
records, for the most part I will draw on the fieldwork of Rosemary Sayigh and Julie Peteet. The 
two anthropologists began their fieldwork in the 1970s and the 1980s and the data they have 
collected has derived from interviews with camp residents based on their recollections.  
 
When the Palestinians – most of them from Galilee – arrived in Lebanon in 1948, their presence 
was understood as temporary. Traditional Arab notions of hospitality prevailed: The host 
welcomed the guest but the guest also assured the host that he would not outwear his welcome. In 
those early days, the Lebanese army distributed flyers in the camps urging the refugees to “please 
the [Lebanese] as long as [they] are in their land” and to “treat [them] with care and respect as 
long as [they] are in their home” (Peteet 2005: 110). The Palestinians reciprocated not only by 
reassuring their hosts of their transitory presence, but also by declining initiatives and services 
which could be perceived to imply permanent resettlement. In the West Bank camp of Dayr 
Ammar, for example, the refugees destroyed a nursery built by the UNRWA as it was viewed to 
as a sign of resettlement (Bisharat 1997: 212). Similar incidents were repeated in camps across the 
region, both inside Lebanon and in other states. 
 
4.1.  Location and spatial arrangement 
The process through which the camps were established was influenced by a number of factors. 
The camps were dispersed throughout Lebanon, but with a higher concentration in its eastern and 
southern regions. While some camps were rural in character, the camps near cities assumed the 
form of urban slums (Peteet 2005: 107-108). Christian refugees were given land by Lebanese 
churches, but the majority of the camps were located in or around Muslim areas, in conformity to 
the prevailing logic of Lebanese sectarianism (R. Sayigh 1994: 25). These camps were built either 
on uncultivable land – as the Lebanese state was not prepared to waste fertile land – or on 
abandoned military barracks dating from the era of the French mandate. The latter, structured on a 
regimented grid pattern, had been previously used to shelter Armenian refugees fleeing from 
Turkey as World War I came to a close (Sirhan 1975: 91; Peteet 2005: 198). The fact that the 
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Lebanese government declared the southernmost regions of the country as no-go areas for 
Palestinians to avoid high Palestinian concentrations on the borders with Israel, completed the 
separation of the Palestinian refugees from their home landscape. As the population of the camps 
grew, their spatial layout tended to become increasingly chaotic, as in the case of Ayn al-Hilweh, 
which developed into a succession of winding alleys resembling a maze. Some camps were 
formed by chance, as was the case with the Nahr al-Bared camp in Tripoli – initially intended to 
serve as a transit point to Syria, but where the refugees had to settle since Syria had closed its 
borders (Peteet 2005: 107). 
 
Irrespective of the spatial layout of the camps, they were conceived as transitory, non-permanent 
places. They corresponded well to Marc Augé’s conception of  “non-places” (1994) and as such 
possessing no identity (ibid.: 92). The refugee camps were not places of choice but the outcome of 
violent displacement and attempted denationalization (Peteet 2005: 94). This sense of “non-place” 
was further enhanced after the host state encircled the camps with barbed wire and by prohibiting 
the erection of more permanent structures within them, such as houses or even zinc roofed shacks 
(ibid.: 103). The camps’ boundaries were the cognitive border between the Palestinians and their 
hosts, very much resembling a borderland, a geopolitical territory that served as a demarcation 
line between two sides – While to a great extent arbitrarily defined and policed, it also functioned 
as a mixing zone, bringing people together through legal and illegal practices of crossing and 
communicating (Clifford 1999: 304).  
 
As years and decades passed by, the refugees turned the camps into regular places of residence. 
The power of custom in ordinary life imposed within the camps specific forms of social 
organization and cultural maps, thus establishing meaningful places at odds with the original 
“non-place” rationale of the camps. 
         
4.2.  Relations with the host environment 
Relation between refugees and their host environment were tense. The refugees were now landless 
in a society where land ownership was deemed the foremost source of wealth, power and political 
influence. This is aptly summarized by the Arabic proverb “ardi´irdi” (“my land is my honour”) 
(Bisharat 1997: 214). The Palestinian refugees, therefore, found themselves at the bottom of social 
hierarchy. They were often attributed violent natures by locals, exemplified by the description of 
the camps as “zoos” (R. Sayigh 1979: 126). The Palestinians’ plight had turned them into objects 
of superstitious fear and ridicule. This was sufficiently manifested by the exclusion of Palestinian 
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children from games, by pointing and mocking, by the absence of normal courtesy towards them 
and by their scapegoating (R. Sayigh 1979: 125-127).  
 
At the economic level, the refugees faced the resentment of the Lebanese business class, which 
feared competition from its Palestinian counterpart, as much as the distrust of the indigenous 
working class, which saw the arrival of the refugees as competitors in the job market (Peteet 2005: 
109-110) – This, in spite of the fact that the majority of the male refugees of working age were in 
fact unemployable peasants who knew only how to work the land (R. Sayigh 1979: 115). 
 
4.3.  Reconstructing the village in the camps 
While the movement of rural Palestinians to the cities predated the Nakbah, the rural/urban divide 
became most visible in exile. Around 75,000 middle- and upper-class Palestinians had already 
departed on their own will after hearing of the UN Partition Plan (Bisharat 1997: 207-208) and 
before diplomacy broke into open warfare. They settled well in the cities of the host countries 
mainly thanks to their social and kinship networks (Peteet 2005: 206). However, the 
overwhelming majority of the refugees were peasants coming from tightly-knit village 
communities. The greater the pressure on such communities to modify their structural forms and 
cultural norms, the more they were disposed to symbolically reassert their boundaries (A. Cohen 
1989: 44). As the village was found at the heart of rural Palestinian life before the Nakbah, the 
internment of whole villages into camps threatening with homogenization (i.e.. their blanket 
classification as refugees) produced the reaction of a reassertion of local identities as resistance to 
resettlement. A Palestinian in a Lebanese camp who left his village at the age of seven, could still 
vividly remember: 
If you ask me about my village, I can remember the most important things, and even the 
small ones. I think the reason for this is deprivation. Second, our families would always talk 
about the past, and about their land, so that these things are impressed on the mind of the 
Palestinian child. He feels the difference between that life and this. He longs for that life to 
continue, and to make his own life a part of that country (Palestine) (anonymous refugee 
quoted in R. Sayigh 1979: 11) 
 
 
4.3.1.  Storytelling 
Stories help the survivors of a disaster retain their cohesion, as their collective psychology and 
experience is affirmed (Jackson 2002: 103). Stories about village life in Palestine enabled the 
numerous local identities to endure while in the camps. This became an important means for 
cultural survival, symbolized in the dawaween, informal social gatherings in the camps where the 
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elders recounted memories of Palestine (Peteet 2005: 116). Refugee stories were motivated by an 
existential need rather than emotion (Jackson 2002: 93). They were unstructured and often inflated 
by statements like “we lived in paradise” (quoted in R. Sayigh 1979:10). This was the only way 
available to them for passing on to their children their inheritance, their homes. (ibid.: 11).  
 
4.3.2.  Village life in Palestine 
The social organization of the camps reflected in the early days the social organization within 
Palestine itself. It will be therefore useful to provide a summary of the latter, as a key to 
understanding its reconstructed version inside the refugee camps. 
 
The majority of Palestinian Arabs, the peasants (fellaheen), were divided into, and identified 
themselves with, village units. A major reason for this was the Ottoman administrative system. 
Each administrative sub-unit (nahiya) consisted of several villages (Pappé 2004: 15), leading to a 
degree of decentralization. This led to a strong village solidarity, which both satisfied the need of 
the Ottomans for cheap administration, and of the peasants for security. Later the British, with 
their practice of “indirect rule” in their colonies, continued this tradition in the period of the 
Palestine Mandate. Village solidarity became even stronger during the time of the Great Revolt, 
when the colonial authorities introduced the practice of collective punishment of villages 
suspected of harbouring Arab fighters (R. Sayigh 1979: 14-15).  
 
4.3.2.1.  Economic status 
Each village was a self-sufficient unit of production and consumption as the peasants produced 
most of their own foodstuff (ibid.: 28). Labour division was gendered, with women working in the 
home and men in the fields (Pappé 2004: 17). Poverty was widespread, mainly because of the 
peasants’ access to land with limited fertility. Cultivable land was divided in the coastal plain 
(sahel) and the hill country (jebel), with peasants having only access to the latter, as a 
consequence of their standing in the social hierarchy. The rural class was most hard-hit in 
economic terms by the events at the beginning of the 20th century. During the end of Ottoman rule, 
the peasant tax paid in grain was replaced to one paid with money. Illiteracy and the difficulties in 
negotiating prices meant that peasants were easy victims for moneylenders. The British imposed a 
more rigid tax system, making assets such as trees and houses eligible for taxation, often using 
troops for collecting them, thus leading to growing debts and resentment (R. Sayigh 1979: 26-29). 
The economic transactions between the Zionist movement and rich Arab absentee landlords – 
most of them living outside of Palestine and owning around 20% of private land – made many 
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Palestinians landless or forced them to move to uncultivable land (Pappé 2004: 98-99). Equally 
disastrous for the many urbanized peasants, was the boycott of Arab labour called for by the 
Histradut, the Zionist trade union in 1929 (ibid.: 112)42. 
 
4.3.2.2.  Social relations 
In the absence of a strong centralized state, the main source of social security in the villages was 
the family. The most common words used for “house” by Palestinians, beit or dar, are also 
synonyms for “family”. Kinship in the village through clans (hamuleh) was patrilineal and 
important in cementing village identity. All relationships between people of the same village were 
determined in kinship terms. Family loyalties and clan loyalties were not divergent but 
complementary and overlapping with each other. Feuds between clans over scarce resources, often 
resulting in honour killings, were balanced by social pressure for reconciliation (“atwi”) (R. 
Sayigh 1979: 21-24). Social control through mediation attempts by family members also helped to 
diffuse crime in the camps (Sirhan 1975: 193). Village and clan rivalries also took place in the 
“days of the Revolution” (ayaam al-Thawra), when village and clan loyalties merged with (but 
were not eclipsed by) political allegiances. In the camps feuds developed under political pretexts 
(Peteet 2005: 118), even though the number of honour killings remained low and were 
increasingly viewed by most Palestinians as a relic from times past (R. Sayigh 1979: 23). Village 
endogamy survived in the early years of displacement but growing intermarriage later would lead 
to the forging of close relations between different villages (Peteet 2005: 116). 
 
Gender relations in rural Palestine were not different from those found in other traditional Arab 
societies, although it should be noted that there was an absence of the strict space segregation 
between public (male) and private (female) spaces, found in other Muslim societies (R. Sayigh 
1979: 23). In exile, the spatial cramping of the refugee camps signalled an almost complete 
absence of privacy and the mixing of private and public space. Women would often cook food 
outside and wear informal dress in the smaller camps (Peteet 2005: 119). Strong morality codes of 
honour and reputation, especially as regards women, prevailed in the village and survived in the 
camps. Women were discouraged to walk outside the camp without protection, and the adherence 
to morality customs was one of the main competition points between families (R. Sayigh 1979: 
24). 
 
                                                
42 The boycott was not always successful. Jewish and Arab workers took part together in a truck-drivers strike that 
paralyzed the country in 1931 (Pappé 2004: 113). 
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4.3.3.  Local inscriptions on the camp landscape 
The refugees translated their local identities into inscriptions in the camps they inhabited. In the 
days after the Nakbah, each camp was a microcosm of the Galilean landscape. Camp 
neighbourhoods were inhabited by people coming from a specific village (Khalili 2004: 11). The 
larger the village, the more distinct its area and the more dominant its role was in local affairs.  
Villages were relocated, newly landscaped and socially reconfigured, while their original 
geographic locations were renamed and occupied by settlers (Peteet 2005: 111). Even in the most 
spatially confined and geographically isolated situations of the camps, locality was carefully 
maintained. (Appadurai 1995: 205). The refugees used regional and village stereotypes to locate 
their new neighbours cognitively. For example, people from the village of Tarshiha were regarded 
as educated, ´Amqa people were loyal, Al Kabri people were hardworking, Al Bassa women were 
strong and dominant, Beduins were regarded as the real embodiers of Arab culture, Ghawarneh 
people were conservative and uneducated, and people from Saffuriyah, one of the largest villages 
in Galilee, were considered arrogant. While creating boundaries among themselves, the village 
refugees also distanced themselves from urban Palestinians who were considered educated but too 
concerned with appearances (Peteet 2005: 116-117).  
 
In his study of locality production, Appadurai describes refugee camp neighbourhoods as one the 
most extreme examples of neighbourhoods that are context-produced rather than context-driven 
(1995: 217). Yet in the case of the Palestinians, village neighbourhoods generated a context of 
their own; the above-mentioned stereotypes produced difference, which was not of an exclusive 
nature. It was rather a way of expressing resistance to any attempt of resettlement and cultural 
homogenization. The preservation of the fabric of life before the Nakbah was deemed as essential 
for cultural survival. Furthermore, the proximity of so many villages to one another in the camps 
generated an environment in which an overall national identity could emerge. Women from 
different villages for example regularly exchanged recipes, leading to the creation of something 
resembling a national cuisine (Peteet 2005: 115). 
 
4.4.  Formation of refugee identity and the aid regime 
Palestinian identity in the Lebanese camps in the early days was to a great extent shaped by the 
services of the UNRWA. That is why this era is referred to in their everyday talk as ayaam al-
UNRWA (the UNRWA days) and the generation that grew up in those years as jeel al-UNRWA 
(the UNRWA generation). In line with the creation of agencies such as the UNHCR, the UNRWA 
was the product of the most recent developments in the field of refugee management. Following 
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World War II, most of the world’s refugees originated from Eastern Europe, leading to an exilic 
bias (Aleinikoff 1995: 261-2), i.e. to a perception, influenced by Cold War anti-communist 
politics, that refugees should be provided with the best possible care. Explicitly political motives 
underlined such thinking, as illustrated by U.S. radio broadcasts in the 1950s regarding Palestinian 
refugees: 
Help fight Communism...The people of the Middle East are...weakened by hunger and 
homelessness...devoid of hope, the perfect prey for Communist promises... (quoted in Peteet 
2005: 67) 
 
Over the years, this shifted to a so-called source control bias, meaning that more pragmatic 
approaches were adopted such as the repatriation of the refugees, either to their country of origin 
or the host country (Aleinikoff 1995: 262). This meant that rich countries and organizations were 
no longer eager to provide exemplary conditions to refugees to keep them away from antagonistic 
ideologies. They now treated refugee situations as mere logistical matters of mass movement that 
had to be contained. 
 
The UNRWA was set up especially for the Palestinian refugees, and has in its history balanced 
between providing the best possible conditions for refugees and trying to keep the dream of 
returning to Palestine alive. Like all aid regimes, its underlying assumption was that new places 
could be crafted through bureaucracies (Peteet 2005: 68). From the refugee perspective, the 
disparity between the manifested aims (return) and latent attempts (resettlement) of a bureaucracy 
became evident and influenced their behaviour towards it (Voutira & Bond 1995: 216). Fearing 
that they would have to give something back in return, Palestinian refugees were mistrustful of 
UNRWA, which they viewed as acting in collusion with the USA, Israel and the Arab regimes, as 
part of a resettlement scheme43. However at the same time, UNRWA supported the refugees 
through education and health programs that enabled them to face up to their predicament. 
 
4.4.1.  Perceptions of refugees in discourse 
Mass movements of refugees always represent a problem, a failure of the state system that has to 
be resolved (ibid.: 257). This perception is reinforced by the notion of the national order of things 
(Malkki 1995), a view of the world’s cultural divisions as truthfully corresponding to the political 
demarcation lines drawn on the geographical map. Statelessness and displacement are therefore 
described in mainstream discourse as something pathological, hence the use of botanical 
                                                
43 Israel did not oppose the creation of UNRWA because it viewed it as a means to resettle refugees (Peteet 2005: 62). 
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expressions such as “uprooting” when referring to refugees (Malkki 1997: 65). The cliché image 
of the refugee is constructed as an irrational figure whose judgement and reason has been 
compromised by his or her experience. Women and children tend to be visually over-represented 
in that image, as they embody the institutional, international expectation of a certain kind of 
helplessness (Malkki 1996: 384-388). As most refugee situations occur in poor parts of the world, 
where it is assumed by the host state that its infrastructure cannot cope without external aid 
(Voutira & Bond 1995: 212), refugees fall usually under the control of international aid regimes 
which have a logic of their own. These institutions not only tend to treat refugees as purely 
humanitarian issues but also as depoliticised and ahistorical figures. They try to present refugees 
as mute subjects, detached from their specific contexts (Malkki 1996: 378). In the case of the 
Palestinians in Lebanon however, the UNRWA did not silence the refugees but, through a series 
of measures, subscribed to their empowerment.  
 
4.4.2.  The refugee camps as places of biopower 
Refugee camps are managed by extensive bureaucracies assigned with the task of allocating aid, 
with authority exercised through distance and mobility mostly possessed only by officials 
(Inhetveen 2006: 90). Their population is essentially multicultural, encompassing different 
mentalities, hierarchies, divisions of labour and administration (Voutira and Bond 1995: 210). The 
UNRWA generated a patron-refugee system of management (Peteet 2005: 83) with foreign aid 
officials at the top, and rank-and-file Palestinian employees acting as gatekeepers between the 
refugees and foreigners. It acted as a modern state institution for a people without a state in so far 
as social services and protection were concerned. An important characteristic of modern capitalist 
state power, as compared to the semi-feudal conditions in Palestine, is the constant presence of the 
state in all spheres of life, and the exercise of this control in ways quite more subtle than the direct 
threat or actual use of force.  
 
In his concept of biopower, Foucault argued that power over death has been replaced by power to 
give and maintain life (1983). Biopower was expressed in the Lebanese camps by processes such 
as the classification and enumeration of those eligible for aid. Disciplining the refugees by issuing 
them with monthly rations of 10 kilos of flour and bread was integral to successfully managing the 
camps, which were run on firm discipline (Peteet 2005: 69). A refugee described his experience of 
going to school during those days as follows: 
Everyday we followed the same routine. The home-room teacher would come and inspect 
us, just like in the army. They inspected our hair, to make sure it is well combed, our clothes 
to make sure they are tidy... (Rafiq, refugee quoted in Peteet 2005: 84) 
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For a rural people that mostly produced what they ate before the Nakbah, the ration card was a 
strong symbol of subjection. If food constitutes an important part of cultural identity, then the 
ration cards represented for the refugees another attempt to deprive them of their identity and 
history. Despite this, the card also gave the Palestinians a symbol to claim as their own, for it 
represented their temporary status: 
It meant international recognition. It said: “You have lost your land. You have temporary 
status until you return“. So Palestinians understood the ration card as a national identity 
card. It meant we had rights somewhere. (Rafiq, refugee quoted in Peteet 2005: 74 
 
Classification highlighted differences within Palestinian society. Many tried to manipulate 
classification systems to receive more rations, leading to some social inequalities. Also, the aid 
system helped in emphasizing local and gender divisions. Families were classified as adult males 
and their dependents (ibid.: 71-72)44. The first rations were distributed based on village 
aggregates, contributing to the continuity of local identities. Classification also led to the creation 
of new identities, as the refugees were now not only classified by their locality of origin but also 
by their camp and host country45. Merging with nationalist discourse, it provided a cognitive 
image to the refugees of the nation as a non-contiguous unit encompassing different camps in 
different host countries instead of the localities from which they were displaced (ibid.: 73).  
 
4.4.3.  Shaping of national identity through education 
An important transforming factor for the refugees was the education service provided by 
UNRWA. It was quite different from the education they had received in Palestine where the 
authorities, as in other colonies, were less concerned with mass education and more with the 
creation of an elite of local administrative bureaucrats (Abu-Lughod 1973: 103). Back in Palestine 
education facilities were concentrated in the cities, making access for the peasants difficult. The 
UNRWA schools differed from the few religious rural schools in that they were accessible to girls 
and consisted of a standardized curriculum with examinations (Peteet 2005: 87). In addition, their 
quality was superior to that of Lebanese schools, leading to resentment by the locals (ibid.: 74)46. 
 
The mass education of women transformed gender relations significantly. In the early days their 
enrolment figures still lagged behind those of men, but by the mid-60s the gap closed. The 
empowerment of women enabled them to join the ranks of political organizations during the 
                                                
44 To this day, women refugees cannot pass refugee status on to their children. 
45 Palestinians meeting abroad will often refer to each other as “Palestinians of Lebanon”, “of Syria” and so forth. 
46 They were superior to public Lebanese schools. High standard education was only accessible to rich Lebanese and 
urban Palestinians who could afford it (Peteet 2005: 74). 
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height of PLO influence in Lebanon. Women began to take decisions, often breaking free from 
traditional family authority. Whereas the routine of young women in Palestine was centred on the 
house, in the camps it revolved around school. Young men were also affected by secular 
education, as traditional notions of masculinity encouraged by religious schools in Palestine were 
put into questions by the values and skills it promoted. Due to education, they found themselves 
being granted the same respect as older men (ibid.: 88-89).  
 
In his work Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson identifies the development of print 
capitalism as the key factor in the development of national consciousness. It helped spread the 
knowledge necessary for the infusion of the national Self in the population at large (2006: 44-45). 
Knowledge systems that were confined to a small nationalist elite in Palestine now became 
available to the refugees at large through mass education. Yet the curriculum of  UNRWA was a 
source of controversy. While in theory obliged to refrain from politics in the classroom, the more 
permanent the character of the agency became, the more Palestinians employed by it as teachers 
were willing to bend this rule. Rafiq, a refugee notes: 
In the curriculum there was no political education and yet the teachers managed to slip in all 
sorts of information about our cause, what had happened, how it had happened, what the 
Israelis did, what the Arabs did. So we were always fed this information unofficially; it 
wasn’t part of the curriculum...Yet this was a chance to learn it. (quoted in Peteet 2005: 90) 
 
Parallel to normal schools, the UNRWA offered vocational training opportunities to enable 
refugees to support themselves and form a regional upwardly mobile labour force (ibid.: 86). 
Graduates from UNRWA vocational schools often went on to work as skilled workers in the oil 
fields of the Gulf, thus sending back money to their families in the camps. 
 
It was in the schools that the younger generation of Palestinians became fully aware of their 
situation, through the exchange of experiences with fellow students from other villages. The 
UNRWA and its services were critical in shaping Palestinian identity in the camps. Although 
starting with intentions common to other refugee regimes, like the rehabilitation and eventual 
resettlement of refugees, it’s services had unintended political implications (Al-Husseini 2000: 
52). UNRWA status was a sign of protection and of an eventual return to an independent 
Palestine. Although mistrustful of the agency at the beginning, the Palestinians would come to 
appreciate its services and remember the ayaam al-UNRWA nostalgically: 
UNRWA was a buffer between us and the reality of being refugees. It provided us with the 
means to live. (Abu Salim, refugee in Shatila, quoted in Peteet 2005: 52) 
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During the ayaam al-Thawra, during the “days of the Revolution”, the UNRWA and the 
Palestinian resistance movement would cooperate. This led to the significant downsizing of the 
agency’s operations in Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 1982 and the destruction of UNRWA 
facilities as “legitimate terrorist targets”. 
 
 
 
5.  Landscape and Identity: ayaam al-Thawra 
 
Nineteen sixty-eight was a year of rupture for the Palestinians in Lebanon. The PLO, led by Yassir 
Arafat’s Fatah faction, launched a guerilla war against Israel from the south of the country. This 
aggravated tensions with the Lebanese security forces resulting in skirmishes. The Palestinian 
resistance benefited from massive support from the local population who saw this as undermining 
their country’s sectarian status quo. The confrontation between the Lebanese government forces 
and Fatah came to a head on 23rd April 1969 when the army clashed with guerillas in the southern 
village of Bint Jbeil (cf. R. Sayigh 1979). Massive demonstrations ensued in all Palestinian camps 
and by September every camp in Lebanon was set free from the control of the Deuxieme Bureau, 
the Lebanese intelligence service. The resulting Cairo Agreement made now the presence of 
armed Palestinian fighters in the camps official, transforming their character from places of 
confinement to autonomous, national spaces (Peteet 2005: 133). Additionally, following its 
expulsion from Jordan47 in 1970, the PLO made Beirut its headquarters and the unofficial capital 
of a Palestinian state in the making. In Palestinian discourse, the period that ensued is remembered 
as ayaam al-Thawra (days of the Revolution). This was not a fully-fledged revolution48, but it did 
involve a very high degree of grass-roots mobilization among the camp population. 
 
5.1.  Extraterritorial nation-building 
Armed struggle for the PLO was not necessarily the means to liberate Palestine but an instrument 
to assert itself as an internationally recognized state-level actor with undisputed negotiating 
authority. Armed activity also served to protect the new state-building process underway in the 
refugee camps (Y. Sayigh 1997: 27). The PLO institutionalized its presence in the camps by 
                                                
47 Those events subsequently became known as “Black September”, named after the month during which King 
Hussein, fearful of increased Palestinian power, decided to crack down on the movement. 
48 In the Arab world the term “revolution” is used quite loosely. Even coups and palace revolts are invariably 
conferred with the definition. 
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establishing, along with its political-military infrastructure, a complex economic and social edifice 
that complemented the services provided by UNRWA49.  
 
The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) in Lebanon operated 11 major hospitals and 60 
clinics where access was free of charge for PLO members while non-PLO members, Palestinians 
and Lebanese, were given access through the PLO Institution of Social Affairs and Welfare. 
International assistance - in the form of volunteers, training and funds - was provided by the 
World Health Organization, by countries such as Sweden, Japan and East Germany, as well as 
international solidarity organizations. The PRCS also had an accessible Social Department, for the 
vocational training of unemployed camp women (Rubenberg 1983: 62-65). 
 
Another important institution was the Palestine Martyrs Works Society (SAMED), which was the 
PLO’s principal section for economic activity. SAMED had 46 factories in Lebanon whose 
purpose was to produce consumer goods for camp residents who could not afford to buy them 
from the Lebanese market, and to export products such as textiles to the Arab and Eastern 
European countries. SAMED also engaged in agriculture by maintaining a network of farms in 
sub-Saharan African countries, producing goods for Palestinian consumption but also advancing 
diplomatic relations through the provision of agricultural training to African farmers to compete 
with similar Israeli efforts in the continent. (ibid.: 66-69). 
 
5.2.  The camps as translocalities 
Gupta and Ferguson define the state through the basic functions of verticality and encompassment 
(2002): Verticality describes the hierarchical structure of the state while encompassment refers to 
the state’s claim to encompass different localities. The PLO operated on a hierarchical structure 
(cf. Rubenberg 1983) and encompassed many different Palestinian inhabited localities, comprising 
the Palestinian “imagined community” (Anderson 2006): the camps in exile, the Palestinians of 
Israel, the Occupied Territories and the Diaspora in non-Arab countries. Social Welfare and 
Economic activities in conjunction with military operations, gave to the PLO the character of a 
state actor. 
 
In examining the relation between territory, state and nation, Appadurai makes the distinction 
between “soil”, the spatialized discourse of belonging, and territory, alluding to the geopolitical 
                                                
49 The two institutions would cooperate in those years, as many UNRWA staff were also members of the Resistance 
movement. 
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integrity, surveyability, policing and subsistence (2003: 340). Undoubtedly, the soil-aspects of the 
Palestinian national discourse in Lebanon remained the villages and land left behind in Palestine. 
But the territorial aspects were to be found in the camps that housed the PLO’s civilian and 
military infrastructure, thus replacing the broken relationship between land and nation with the 
one between nation and state – The new national consciousness was spatialized in the camps’ 
territory. The camps became translocalities, localities which, while officially part of another 
nation-state (in this case Lebanon), are divorced from their national contexts and are drawn in to 
transnational allegiances and interests (ibid.: 343). Beirut in particular was a plural translocality, 
as it became the unofficial capital of a Palestinian state in the making, but also, during the civil 
war, the locality upon which different political utopias, such as the formation of a Christian 
westernized Lebanon or the establishment of an Iranian-inspired Islamic republic were projected.  
 
This territorial assertion of a state-like entity in another country through the establishment of 
institutions and movement-controlling mechanisms such as checkpoints, should not be perceived 
as evidence of a Palestinian desire to take over Lebanon, but as a response to pressure from an 
already established sovereign state (Israel) which manifested its opposition to the Palestinians in 
territorial terms (ibid.: 342; Chapter 3). 
 
5.3.  The new geography of the camps 
By the late 1960s, the camps were growing demographically, leading to more permanent cement 
constructions, and the adding of second floors and private bathrooms. As already argued in 
Chapter 4, the spatial arrangement of the refugee camps in the years immediately after the Nakbah 
reflected the social organization of the peasants in Palestine, suggested by the preservation of the 
village framework. During the ayaam al-Thawra, the village did not fade away from the camp 
landscape. Albeit somewhat overshadowed, the village unit was complemented by new landmarks 
such as the offices of political organizations that functioned as public spaces alongside already 
existing centers such as mosques or the offices of UNRWA. Whereas in the past camp residents 
located their neighbours by naming camp quarters after villages in Galilee, now in many camps 
quarters were named after political organizations. The largest organization within the PLO, Fatah, 
was dominant not only politically but also spatially50. Other neighbourhoods were named Hayy 
Sai´qa (Sai´qa neighbourhood) of Hayy Jebhat al-Tahrir (Liberation Front51 neighbourhood). The 
new character of the camps as national spaces was reinforced by the naming of institutions within 
                                                
50 During the civil war, the south of Lebanon was also known as “Fatah-Land”. 
51 The PFLP. 
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the camps (schools, hospitals etc.) after cities in Palestine, for example the Haifa Hospital in the 
Burj al-Barajneh camp (Peteet 2005: 133-137). 
 
An equally important development of that period was the suspension of the camps’ internal and 
external boundaries. In the case of Shatila, the camp borders stretched northwards due to 
demographic growth, while the city of Beirut expanded southwards, also as a result of growing 
economic migration of Shia from southern Lebanon (ibid.: 135). The camp population became 
more diverse as many Palestinians migrated to Europe and the Gulf to work or to the Eastern 
Block to study on PLO scholarships (ibid.: 142). Low-income Shia often moved in, thus 
diminishing the village spatial integrity that once existed (ibid.: 135). After the suppression of the 
PLO in Jordan in 1970, many of its Palestinians moved to the camps of Lebanon. The added 
presence of many Europeans and Americans – mainly medical personnel that arrived in response 
to calls for international support – gave the camps an additional character as cosmopolitan and 
transnational spaces (ibid.: 134). 
 
The blurring of the camps’ boundaries was the spatial expression of the relationship between the 
Palestinians and the Lebanese at that time. For the poorest sections of the Lebanese population, 
the grass-roots activity of the Palestinians became an example to emulate. Furthermore, the 
secular character of their ideology contrasted sharply with the sectarian nature of the country’s 
political system52. For the Palestinians outside the camps, the camps were expressions of authentic 
Palestinianness, as they embodied everything in the modern Palestinian experience: The suffering 
of the exiled, the peasant past as maintained in refugee particularisms, and the will to fight, as 
symbolized by the presence of the fedayeen in the camps. These spaces also provoked a mix of 
guilt and admiration among richer, urban Palestinians who nonetheless also expressed revulsion at 
the refugees’ standard of living (ibid.: 144). For the Palestinians inside the camps, the new spatial 
realities and the militancy associated with the Revolution would play an important part in shaping 
their identity. 
 
5.4.  The formation of the fighter identity 
Ideologically, the PLO had espoused theories of anticolonial nationalism that influenced liberation 
movements throughout the era of decolonization. These were to a great extent inspired by Frantz 
                                                
52 In Lebanon, the term “sect” does not necessarily denote one’s religious beliefs. Although religious persuasions 
form their symbolic boundary markers, sects mostly resemble ethnic groups.  
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Fanon’s53 belief in the redeeming quality of violence in anticolonial struggle (2008). Fighting 
became a form of ritual activity, weapons were fetishized, and combat activity turned into an end 
in itself. As a result, military losses were transformed into moral victories in Palestinian 
nationalist rhetoric; this aura of sacralization legitimized losses and sacrifices (Khalili 2007: 739). 
The funerals of Martyrs in the camps resembled weddings, exhorting the role not only of active 
fighting but also of passive suffering as part of the overall struggle (ibid.: 749).  
 
The Palestinians of the camps had always resented the term “refugee” because of its negative 
connotations of vulnerability and helplessness54. Instead the term “returnee” was used to underline 
the desire to return and the temporarieness of their condition. Empowered by the new freedom of 
the camps, the camp residents also started using terms like “revolutionary”, “struggler”, or 
“militant” (Peteet 1998: 75). This was not merely an indication of an emerging culture of violence 
– the images of Palestinians hijacking aircraft did certainly produce such representations 
throughout the world in the 1970s – but it symbolized a future-oriented activism and progress; it 
symbolized moving forward instead of just waiting to return (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 122). The 
Palestinian camp refugees in Lebanon were especially radicalized due to their social position as an 
ethnically defined and overexploited proletariat (cf. Sayigh 1978). For them, struggle came as if 
natural to them: 
Books (about Palestine) are for foreigners. It is from my nature that I struggle. (camp 
refugee quoted in R. Sayigh 1977b: 29) 
 
This was something as essential as one’s gender. The Palestinian refugee and author Ghasan 
Kanafani writes in his novel Of Men and Rifles: 
You cannot ask a fighter why he is fighting. It is as if you asked a man why he is a male. 
(quoted in Lindholm Schulz 2003: 126) 
 
The loss of bodily connection to a national homeland is often equated with the loss of moral 
bearings (Malkki 1997: 63). Therefore fighting in this case acquires a new meaning: Not only lost 
land but also lost honour has to be reclaimed (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 126; Cockburn 1988: 20). 
The word feday – fighter – literally translated means “one who redeems a captive” or “someone 
who sacrifices” (Khalili 2007: 742). Men who fought display certain nostalgia for that era: 
As a civilian you don’t do anything. You are lazy, you sit around, drink coffee and visit with 
people. But as a military person, military life is respected, it teaches you discipline, bravery, 
pride of your dignity, ethics, how to treat people, which is why I prefer the military life. It 
                                                
53 Frantz Fanon was himself active in the guerrilla struggle aginst the French in Algeria. 
54 For more on this point see present thesis, Chapter 4. 
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was my aim in life to fight, so when I was wounded I was happy to get better and go to fight 
some more. (Abu Hussein, former guerilla, Burj al-Barajneh camp, quoted in Khalili 2007: 
742) 
 
Whereas essentialist identities of belonging to an “imagined community” – whether an ethnicity, a 
religion or a nation – are exclusivist and may easily degenerate into chauvinism, identities of 
“doing” (working or struggling for instance) as well as identities of “becoming” (e.g. the citizen of 
a future state) tend to have a more inclusive outlook. Significantly, one of the main slogans 
advanced at the time was “Anyone who struggles is a Palestinian”. Echoing this, the PLO offered 
military training in its camps to numerous militant organizations, spanning from the Middle East 
to Latin America and Western Europe. Foreign trainees who displayed excellence in their courses 
were often described by their instructors as “real Palestinians” (Peteet 2005: 146).  
 
Another development was the changing attitude of Palestinians towards Arab identity. Most 
Palestinians in the 1950s and 1960s had placed their faith in the pan-Arabism of Egypt’s president 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, following the Arab defeat in the Six Day War, a Palestinian 
identity emerged. While overlapping with the Arab identity55, it also differed from it as a 
consequence of the experience of statelessness, exile and struggle. Indicative of how influential 
struggle had been in this process is the fact that when camp refugees were asked through a 
questionnaire to select an identity other than the Palestinian, many responded by choosing that of 
countries with liberation movements like Vietnam or Cuba, Algeria being the only Arab country 
mentioned (R. Sayigh 1977a: 11). This process made many Palestinians to envision their return 
not to social conditions that predated their exile, but to a new secular democratic state for all its 
citizens56. This inclusiveness contrasted to the Zionist ethno-religious state project. 
 
Accompanying this newly found struggle-identity was a continuing contrasting of past and present 
Palestinian resistance efforts, suggesting a generation gap. The old struggle of 1948 was 
backward; the new one was modern: 
Today’s Revolution is an educated revolution. The other was unplanned […] But now the 
Revolution is based on planning, on scientific thinking. (a worker in the camp, quoted in R. 
Sayigh 1977a: 20) 
 
Again, the new struggle entailed high levels of popular involvement in contrast to the old one: 
                                                
55 The two identities were not alternatives. Moreover, camp residents perceived Palestinianism as the more intense 
and exemplary form of Arabism, setting them apart from other Arabs who were allegedly diverging from it (R. Sayigh 
1977b: 22). 
56 The PLO would abandon this goal in the 1970s in favour of a bi-national solution and then a two-state solution. 
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The whole people didn’t participate in the first Revolution, it wasn’t spread throughout 
Palestine. (camp student, quoted in R. Sayigh 1977a: 20) 
 
There was also criticism among the young of the political culture of the older generation some of 
who had expressed even admiration for Hitler in the 1940s: 
Praise of Hitler was part of the wrong culture that was spread among us. Political 
understanding was missing. (camp resident quoted in R. Sayigh 1979: 46) 
 
Loyalties also shifted during the late 1960s and the 1970s. Village and kin loyalties did not 
disappear but their relevance faded. A former guerilla remarked: 
We became one village. Palestine was the name. In the camps, the resistance and one’s 
activities mattered more than the village from where one came. (quoted in Peteet 2005: 134) 
 
Parties and organizations played an important role in shaping the new identity. A distinction was 
made between parties (ahzab), which were seen as “belonging to Arab governments”, 
“reactionary” and “pro-American” on the one hand, and organizations (tanzeemat, harakat), which 
were viewed as the embodiment of the new struggle. The cult of personality around leaders was 
rare, and if a leader was mentioned it was mostly Yassir Arafat, whom the refugees praised for 
“living the life of the people” (R. Sayigh 1977b: 32). 
 
5.4.1.  Women´s empowerment in the Revolution 
Women had always participated, even if marginally, in Palestinian national struggles of the 20th 
century. But with the Nakbah and the experience of exile, the already existing strict attitudes 
became more entrenched, as many exile communities tend to reconstruct themselves as the “ideal” 
embodiments of their native culture, often displaying conservative gender attitudes. A refugee 
woman who participated in the 1936 revolt for example remarked: 
The Palestinian used to be much more advanced in his own country and women were more 
independent and freer […] in the camps the Palestinian became ultrastrict even fanatic about 
the “honour” of his women. Perhaps this was because he had lost everything that gave his 
live meaning and “honour” was the only possession remaining to him. (quoted in Berger 
Gluck 1995: 7) 
 
For women, the ayaam al-Thawra signaled greater mobility and social freedom. Many women 
rushed to join the new groups that came in the camps. A famous saying was that “the man is boss 
at home but that man and woman are both equal in the struggle” (R. Sayigh 1977a: 14), indicating 
how women were constantly torn between two cultural models: the traditional one of being 
restricted at home, and that of becoming an equal member in society through the experience of 
struggle (Mansour 1977: 75). Social conservatism towards women still prevailed, owing to the 
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rural background of most refugees. However, conservative attitudes can change rapidly under 
conditions of crisis, as were the circumstances in the camps (R. Sayigh 1977a: 18).  
 
The various factions of the PLO began to acknowledge the new potentialities posed by the 
contribution of women to the struggle, with the leftist factions of the PLO, the DFLP57 and the 
PFLP, being the most vocal supporters of women’s rights. However, it must be stressed, that the 
new attitude towards women was essentially functional. The leadership did not advocate women’s 
emancipation as a right in itself but rather because it served military objectives. The most 
influential women’s organization, the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) completely 
subordinated itself to the PLO leadership, thus losing its autonomy and any potential it had as a 
feminist force (Berger Gluck 1995: 7).  
 
The level of mobility women enjoy can broadly measure their status. During the early period of 
exile, women could move relatively freely through the streets of the camps, which, as in all other 
Middle Eastern cultures, were defined as a male domain. Inside the camps women were 
comparatively free of harassment by young men, who could otherwise face sanctions from the 
community. Streets outside the camp were quite a different story. The influx of fedayeen from 
Jordan who did not have family in the camps initially raised the alarm among parents. However, 
the fact that these men were affiliated to political organizations meant that they were ultimately 
accountable to someone. As a result, parential hesitations in allowing daughters to move freely 
quickly faded (Peteet 2005: 138-139). The growing spatial mobility of women also led to the 
weakening of village-based clan loyalties, as men and women from different villages began to 
intermarry (ibid.: 142). 
 
 
 
6.  The Era of Reconfinement: From 1982 to Present 
 
6.1.  Confrontation with state violence 
The ayaam al-Thawra came to an end in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon and expelled the 
PLO leadership from the country. However, the process of reconfinement started several years 
before with the onset of the civil war. Parallel to the Palestinians’ numerical and logistical 
                                                
57 The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
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build-up, the Lebanese Christian Right was beginning to mobilize its forces for an armed 
confrontation. This was reflected in the increasingly aggressive language adopted towards the 
Palestinians. For the Christians, the Palestinians had taken advantage of their host. “We offered 
them half a loaf and they took the other half” was an often-repeated expression of that 
sentiment. While initially referred to as guests (dayoof), the Palestinians were now attributed 
with the politically loaded term ghuraba, strangers. The presence of the camps as autonomous 
rebellious spaces irritated the Christian Right, which regarded them as an eyesore on the 
Lebanese landscape.  
 
The activities of the Phalange suggested an aesthetic of place destruction. Its leaders talked 
openly of constructing tennis courts and shopping malls on the sites of destroyed camps such as 
Tel al-Za´tar (ibid.: 144-145)58. In the process of the civil war, the Phalange evolved into a 
Christian fundamentalist organization. It started as an organization with fascist characteristics, 
such as the personality cult around a leader. But after the death of its young leader, Bashir 
Gemayel, it also increasingly became defined by a religious rhetoric. The organization was 
connected to the Maronite clergy and placed particular value in Lebanon’s antique Phoenician 
past and in the more recent French influences. The Lebanese Christians were viewed as on a 
“mission civilatrice” in the region, and their setbacks were explained by the “moral 
degeneration” of the West, which had forsaken its Christian values, thus failing to protect them. 
This outlook was complemented by a discourse of spiritual renewal (Hage 1992: 35).  
 
In this context, the armed presence of the Palestinians represented the most abhorrent form of 
the Other, which by all means had to be eliminated. After all, the Palestinians were 
predominantly Muslim and Arab in identity, foreign in origin, and to a high degree politically 
left-oriented. Linguistic differences were used to identify this Other. Christian soldiers would 
often ask Palestinians at checkpoints to say “tomato”, which in Lebanese Arabic is pronounced 
bandura and in Palestinian banadura. “Wrong” pronunciation meant detention, even death 
(Peteet 1995: 176, quoted in Linholm Schulz 2003: 60). The hatred towards the Palestinians 
culminated in the Sabra and Shatila massacre by Christian death squads in 1982.  
 
                                                
58 This willingness for place destruction driven by an existential fear of the Other was reaffirmed in the summer of 
2007 in the destruction of the Nahr al-Bared camp, which was justified through the alleged presence of Al Qaeda cells 
in the camps. 
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These death squads came into the open at a time when similar operations occurred in other 
parts of the globe, especially Latin America. While not part of the state apparatus as such, death 
squads are usually sanctioned by the state and enable governments to maintain a “plausible 
denial” of involvement in their deeds (Sluka 2000: 5). This particularly vicious exercise in state 
repression was to be repeated in Lebanon where the personnel of the death squads and of the 
Christian-dominated state overlapped. 
 
Two anthropological views have emerged on the origins of state violence in general. One holds 
that the crisis of the state is the reason behind an increase in state violence, while the other 
suggests that elites that resort to terror do so because the state is strong and can therefore get 
away with it (ibid.: 30-1). The first approach seems to better fit the Lebanese experience: The 
growing strength of the Palestinians questioned the legitimacy of the sectarian state, which in 
turn sparked the violent reaction of the ruling Christian elites. 
 
6.2.  The Palestinian-Shia split and the War of the Camps 
While the clash between the Palestinians and the Christians was largely anticipated, what 
proved strategically disastrous for the Palestinians was the collapse of their cordial relations 
with the Shia. This happened for a number of reasons. To begin with, Fatah attempted to 
increase its influence in the predominantly Shia south by engaging in the establishment of local 
organizations, otherwise known as “shops” (dalakin). The dalakin owed political loyalty to 
their Palestinian paymasters, but otherwise were little more than criminal street gangs. The 
religiously devout Shia accused the mainly secular Palestinians of behaving arrogantly towards 
them at military checkpoints and of abusing their power. They also felt that they had paid the 
highest price for Israeli air strikes, which usually occurred after Palestinian guerrillas attacked 
from within Shia territory (Brynen 1989: 57). 
 
The Days of the Revolution gave rise to growing interaction and the establishment of social 
networks between Palestinians and Lebanese Shia, which in turn brought about the blurring of 
camp boundaries. Now the Shia residing inside the camps were urged to leave by their leaders, 
turning the camps once more into homogenous spaces and identifiable targets At the same time, 
Palestinians residing outside the camps faced intimidation campaigns intended to force them 
back into the ghetto. Amal had begun to delineate geographically the camps of Shatila and Burj 
al-Barajneh in Beirut, by blowing up the houses found on their outer limits. This was done both 
to isolate the camps and expose them for surveillance purposes. Observation posts were erected 
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around the camps by the Shia Amal militias, which Palestinian men tended to avoid, as the risk 
of being shot at was extremely high. Women were tasked with the delivery of supplies, which 
nonetheless were invariably gunned down by snipers (Peteet 2005: 161-167). The War of the 
Camps was now underway. 
 
The siege of the camps by their once friendly Shia neighbours shocked the Palestinians. Yet, 
the development of social visiting networks, especially between Palestinian and Shia women, 
was helpful to the besieged Palestinians. A former fighter describes the situation: 
Do you really think we were completely cut off from the outside? We would have died! 
We had Shia friends in Amal who looked the other way and allowed us to smuggle in 
food, medicine and weapons. Others we paid. These Shia kids did not know what they 
were fighting for and they were terrified…We knew them well – we had been neighbours 
and friends for many years. (quoted in Peteet 2005: 155) 
 
Appadurai indicates that often ethnocidal violence is not only caused from uncertainty about 
the Other but also because of uncertainty about the ethnic Self (1998: 244, quoted in Peteet 
2005: 160). The Shia were trying to assert themselves as part of a newly found Lebanese 
national collective identity which ascribed the troubles faced by the country on outsiders. This 
was a field traditionally hegemonized by the Maronite Christians, who de-emphasized the 
country’s Arab character in favour of a Western-oriented identity. 
 
6.3.  The emergence of new communities 
 
6.3.1.  Communities of suffering 
The spatial reconfinement of the Palestinians, the suspension of their nation-building process, 
and the hardships suffered by the refugees over the last two decades has resulted in the 
formation of new identities and communities. The identity of the Palestinians in the camps of 
Lebanon now became overtly multifaceted. Whereas in the ayaam al-UNRWA it was local and 
in the ayaam al-Thawra predominantly national, currently it combines a mixture of localism, of 
a nationalism more conditioned by the refugees’ marginalization rather than official top-down 
rhetoric, and of attachment to places of collective suffering. 
 
The latter component has influenced the formation of new homogenizing identifications. The 
displaced survivors of the destroyed Tel al-Za´tar camp were relocated to Shatila and were 
from then on identified as the “Tel al-Za´tar people”. Their suffering has generated new social 
networks that endure to this day. A poetic example of this trend is found in a story recited 
throughout the camps during the 1990s of a boy who saw a dream. In it, the refugees return to 
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Palestine and, while most of them return to their villages of origin, the survivors of the Shatila  
massacre come together and form a new community (Peteet 1998: 63).  
 
Identification with places embodying suffering serves specific purposes: While it expresses 
resilience to the disruptive effects of oppressor violence and the impunity enjoyed by its 
perpetrators, at the same time it is a step towards an alternative route to nation building – often 
at odds with that envisioned by the ethnically defined nationalist discourse (Afflito 2000: 120-
121).  
 
Places associated with suffering play an important part in the Palestinian collective 
consciousness. They are seen as part of the greater geography of displacement and national 
suffering, including places ranging from Deir Yassin in Palestine to Sabra and Shatila in 
Lebanon. Each successive tragedy is seen as a continuation of the one preceding it (Peteet 
2005: 203). As the theme of displacement has become all pervading in the Palestinian 
experience of the last 60 years, it has strengthened rather than weakened the determination of 
the refugees never to be displaced again. Longing for a return to Palestine has merged with a 
longing for a ayaam al-Thawra and its territorial manifestations as was the Tel al-Za´tar camp 
(Peteet 2005: 215). 
 
6.3.2.  The moral community 
Reconfinement has severely restricted interaction with the world outside the camps. The camps 
– once cosmopolitan places of interaction with foreigners or Palestinian-friendly Lebanese – 
are today also inhabited by people perceived as a threat, such as non-Palestinian Arab guest 
workers or unknown Palestinians from other camps (ibid.: 178). Relations between camp and 
non-camp urban Palestinians have also grown more distant since 1982.  
 
In her study of Hutu refugees in Tanzania (1989), Malkki has shown how refugees living in 
mixed urban settings lead a cosmopolitan lifestyle while those living in camps were engaged in 
a permanent cultural reproduction of a collective identity, seen as the essential incarnation of 
the collective Self from a moral qualities viewpoint. Enclosed and limited in their movement, 
the Palestinian camp refugees rediscovered traditional forms of association, such as kinship and 
village origins. Furthermore, the camp Palestinians’ negative experiences with Others led in 
recent years to a “moral community” formation whose perceived superior morality sets them 
apart from the Lebanese as well as other Palestinians. Politically, they regard their secularism 
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as a sign of “modernity”, unlike the “backwardness” of religion-based Lebanese politics. They 
remember themselves as honourable fighters in contrast to the Lebanese. Gender and sexuality 
have also been used to construct a morally superior Self, as Palestinian camp narratives suggest 
that Lebanese men and women are unfaithful in relationships and “loose”. Lebanese women are 
seen as lazy and as being preoccupied with appearances “even when the cupboard is empty”, 
by contrast to Palestinian women who make sacrifices for their family. The allusion to an 
empty cupboard points to a lack of hospitality, a key in the construction of honour and prestige. 
On the other hand, camp residents are unwilling to discuss incidents of prostitution or theft 
inside their locale. (Peteet 1998: 78-82).  
 
6.4.  The camps’ present spatial layout 
Soon after the civil war, the centre of Beirut underwent a process of reconstruction, largely 
financed by the Solidere Corporation of the late Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri. This was a highly 
controversial project as critics accused Solidere of putting too much emphasis on commercial 
culture, creating a generic sanitized space, cleared of its turbulent past and oriented towards 
global consumption59. The new look was meant to spatially bury the past of civil unrest. While 
all factions appear willing to overcome their differences, their shared distrust of the 
Palestinians is demonstrated spatially by the limitations imposed on Palestinian place-making 
capabilities. After the war, the Lebanese authorities officially notified UNRWA that rebuilding 
in the Sabra and Shatila camps was not allowed and a large-scale eviction plan was put into 
motion against unauthorized Palestinian settlements in the camps (Aql 1995: 57; R. Sayigh 
1994: 43). Any improvement in the living conditions of the camps was regarded as a potential 
threat (Peteet 2005: 173). In a post-civil war national narrative that sees the country’s problems 
as having been the work of “outsiders”, the Palestinians are (unlike the armies of Israel and 
Syria) the most accessible scapegoat. The division of Beirut in a modern future-oriented city 
centre on the one hand and the slum areas of the camps on the other is not very much unlike the 
urban segregation established in Apartheid South Africa (Bollig, in press).  
 
The camps’ present-day boundaries date mostly from the War of the Camps. In Beirut, where 
the camps are located in Shia areas, the green and yellow banners of Amal and Hizbullah, and 
the pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini and Amal’s founder Imam Mousa Sadr, serve as a symbolic 
reminder of Shia power but, more importantly, clearly demarcate the boundaries of the refugee 
                                                
59  „Middle East Pieces“, New York Times, 21 May 2006 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/21/magazine/21khoury.html?pagewanted=1&fta=y) 
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camps. Reconfinement also imposed a rearrangement of internal space in the camps. In Shatila, 
the mosque reemerged as the centre of the camp, mainly because the Amal militia destroyed 
the surrounding area as well as because a great number of Palestinians found refuge there 
during the siege. It now stands as the main reference point of actual physical as well as 
cognitive movement; the residents pass by it every day while it also serves as a place for 
remembering the dead. Furthermore, streets and alleys are no longer named after armed 
organizations or localities in Palestine, but after violent events. Examples of this are the Street 
of the Massacre in Shatila and the Sniper’s Alley in Burj al-Barajneh (ibid.: 203). The walls of 
the camp alleys are filled with black banners, Koranic verses and pictures of dead martyrs, 
creating a landscape of sorrow and a “memoryskape” of all those events in which Palestinians 
lost their lives: the Nakbah, the Sabra and Shatila massacre and the War of the Camps. 
 
One of the most visible things in the camps is the near absolute absence of men. Many have 
died; some are working aboard, while others keep a low profile. Given that military cultures are 
male-dominated, male identity tends to emerge damaged from a military defeat, while women 
might (just might) gain some empowerment through the fact that they have survived (Sideris 
2001: 52). With the absence of war as a kind of male ritual of passage, unemployed men in the 
camps tend to re-assert traditional notions of masculinity in their personal and interpersonal 
relations (cf. Khawaja & Tewtel-Salem 2004). 
 
6.4.1.  A landscape of commemoration 
Commemoration practices are central to present-day refugee life. These reveal differences in 
narratives within the Palestinian community. Some of these differences are political in 
character and manifest themselves openly. A monument for the assassinated cartoonist Naji al-
Ali, a vocal critic of Arafat, was erected in Ayn al-Hilweh, but was later torn down by “persons 
unknown” (Khalili 2005: 39). Other differences are latent and revolve around the discrepancy 
between official nationalist rhetoric and grass-roots practices. While officialdom treats the 
massacres and defeats as proof of a “heroic struggle” to fulfil Palestinian destiny, grass-roots 
narratives see these events as a part of a “collective suffering” that competes for attention in the 
global arena of human rights discourse. This latter trend can be ascribed in part to the global 
decline of Third World national liberation currents with their emphasis on struggle on the one 
hand, and the emergence of a transnational NGO-related discourse of suffering on the other 
(Khalili 2005, 2007). Since the Oslo Accord, which deferred the refugee issue to future talks, 
the Palestinians in Lebanon feel betrayed by the PLO leadership. Women are especially vocal 
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in the criticism of the leadership, using organic metaphors to illustrate their anger. To give just 
one example: “Arafat fattened himself on our milk and blood” (Peteet 2005: 201)60. Grass-roots 
narratives therefore claim membership in the nation-building process from which the refugees 
feel excluded.  
 
The Palestinians in Lebanon are confronted with two main problems in their commemoration 
efforts. Firstly, others often appropriate their commemorations and narratives. In an attempt to 
destroy any record of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the site of the mass grave was 
transformed into a rubbish dump. Then in 1999, Hizbullah took control of the site and built a 
wall around the grave and planted flowers. However, it has used this site since to promote its 
own political agenda (see Appendix). The banners now adorning the grave demonstrate this. 
Even more tellingly, during the 2002 commemoration of the massacre, Hizbullah invited to the 
ceremony a speaker from Amal, causing the angry departure of the Palestinians present. 
Secondly, most places of Palestinian collective suffering are out of bounds. Openly 
commemorating on site the massacre of Tel al-Za´tar or the destruction of the urban slum of 
Karantina, carried out in concert by Christian and Syrian forces, is just not possible. After the 
Tel al-Za´tar camp was razed to the ground, the site was redeveloped as the headquarters of the 
Phalange. In 1998 the Karantina slum was turned into a nightclub. Its architect turned the site 
into an allegory of sorts. While now a site of pleasure, the theme of the erected structure is a 
war bunker, intended as a criticism to the political amnesia that has beset the country since the 
end of the civil war (Khalili 2005: 42-44, see Appendix). 
 
6.4.1.1.  Cemeteries and monuments 
Cemeteries and graves are an important feature of the culture of commemoration manifested in 
the camps and a potent symbol of the interaction between collective nationalist narratives and 
individual mourning. During the civil war, the PLO constructed two “martyr’s cemeteries” in 
the camps of Shatila and Ayn al-Hilweh to bury the Palestinian dead. Being buried in such a 
nationally-defined place, gives the dead national “sanctity” in addition to the already existing 
religious aura (ibid.: 32).  
 
                                                
60 This is a good example of the way in which women are viewed in nationalist state formation discourses: either as 
participants in military struggles or as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities (Alonso 1994: 385). 
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The Shatila cemetery is unique in the Middle East. It is one of the few burial grounds that 
contain the remains of Muslims as well as Christians and Jews61. Apart from Palestinians, the 
cemetery includes the remains of Turkish, German, Irish, and Iranian guerrillas that fought 
alongside the Palestinians, a sign of the inclusiveness of the struggler identity (argued more 
fully in Chapter 5). Yet cemeteries are also a focal point for established tensions. Palestinians 
have tended in recent years to bury their dead in a non-nationalist context, something to be 
interpreted either as a move beyond or beneath the national concept. 
 
On the one hand, Islamic practices have become more visible, as graves are again religiously 
segregated and burial ceremonies are more influenced by religion than nationalism. Also, 
emphasizing the element of suffering rather than national struggle is meant to present the 
refugees as global humanitarian subjects: 
I want my sons and my grandsons to know what happened, what the world and the Arabs 
have done to us, how they betrayed us. I want the world to know. (Woman in Shatila, 
quoted in Khalili 2005: 35) 
 
On the other hand, the reemergence of local identities also had an impact on burial customs. 
For example, olive trees are planted above graves in urban settings such as traffic roundabouts 
to reproduce the ideal image of a Palestinian cemetery. In addition, the graves of fighters killed 
in the War of the Camps, most of them born in the camps, bear the name of their Palestinian 
village as their place of origin. This is intended to challenge the Zionist narrative of the 
Palestinians’ detachment from their homes by placing the concrete element of locality above 
the abstraction of nation. It is also a refusal to acknowledge their exile by omitting the name of 
a country in which they have suffered so much (ibid.: 35).  
 
Commemorative monuments not only demonstrate tensions among Palestinian narratives but 
also their troubled relationship with the host country. The claim of land ownership through the 
ancestral grave is a feature common in rural cultures, as in the case of the Himba in Namibia 
(cf. Bollig 1997). It is also to found in nationalist discourse. The desecration of graves during 
the Civil War thus took on a symbolic meaning. In 1983, for example, the Phalange turned the 
martyrs’ cemetery in Ayn al-Hilweh into a football ground. The purpose was to prevent the 
Palestinians from burying their dead on Lebanese soil, indicative of the core nationalist belief 
                                                
61 Among the killed in Shatila were also nine elderly Jewish women married to Palestinians (Khalili 2005: 45, 
footnote). 
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that the union between body and soil constitutes the solidification of the deceased’s bond to the 
land (Khalili 2005: 36).  
 
Cemeteries are not the only place to serve as memorial locations. All other places in the camp 
landscape associated with suffering are attributed this function. These include nurseries, 
hospitals, as well as mosques. The Shatila mosque in particular was used as a burial ground 
during the War of the Camps due to the inaccessibility of the cemetery at the time. Places 
where missiles fell and people were killed are also marked. Although accidental places of 
mourning, these locations are incorporated to the commemorative practices while serving as 
landmarks in everyday life (ibid.: 38, see Appendix). 
 
6.4.2.  The reemergence of the village  
One of the most remarkable phenomena of recent years is the reemergence of local 
identifications in the camps. Because localities are life worlds constituted by relatively stable 
associations of people often known to each other (Appadurai 2003: 338), this form of concrete 
identification has become more attractive than the abstract “imagined community” of people 
who will probably never meet each other (Anderson 2006: 6), especially in times of crisis.  
 
When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it was possible for the first time in 
many years for refugees to see the Palestinian landscape again, sometimes reconnecting with 
relatives on the other side of the border (Khalili 2004: 10). The viewing distance from the land 
is often evoked as evidence of belonging to it: 
What sets us here in the region of Tyre apart from other Palestinians of Lebanon is that 
we are very close to nothern Palestine. We see our country every day, and that 
strengthens our hope of return despite the duration of our exile and our dispersion. 
(Muhammad, refugee in Rashidiyyeh, quoted in Aql 1995: 57) 
 
Far from disappearing, local identities are now stronger than during the Thawra-era. Evidence 
of their appeal is the fact that village notables continue to exercise some influence in camp 
affairs. Although these are managed by “popular committees” dominated by political factions 
stemming from the Thawra-era, origin-based “village committees” and funds (sanduq) have 
appeared in recent years. These concentrate on social rather than on political issues, in 
providing for example financial assistance to their members for organizing events such as 
funerals and weddings (ibid.: 12). 
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Another event contributing to the vitality of village-based identities is the publishing of “village 
books” written by members of the post-1948 generations. These are mostly popular historical 
ethnographies of left-behind villages in Palestine describing family histories, farming methods 
and customs, which are not distributed by the political organizations in the camps but by the 
authors themselves, though informal networks of family and friends (ibid,: 15). This emphasis 
on the cultural aspects of everyday life is most interesting because none of the official 
narratives have dealt with it. Even the resurgent Islamic-oriented currents tend to highlight the 
Muslim sacredness of the land rather than focus on concrete life-stories (ibid.: 9). 
 
A number of radio and television programs have also made their appearance for Lebanese as 
well as Palestinian audiences, where elderly Palestinians recall their memories of the land. 
These are characterized by repeated references to the beauty of a natural landscape filled with 
orchards, springs, and rivers. Trees are given detailed description and the perceived superior 
quality of Palestinian agricultural products is often mentioned. The emphasis on natural 
landscape is not mere nostalgia. It is meant to challenge the Zionist narrative of “making the 
desert bloom” (ibid.: 17). Imagining Palestine as a naturally ideal place can also be seen as a 
reaction to the terrible living conditions in the camps: 
But is this place we live in, Shatila, really our identity? Of course not! What can we 
belong to in Shatila? To the garbage? Or to the alleyways that stink of sewage? (Mariam, 
refugee in Shatila62) 
 
6.5.  Palestine: an imagined place 
If print capitalism was essential to the formation of nationalist consciousness, then new 
decentralized forms of communications contribute to the maintenance and expansion of localist 
discourse. The Internet and satellite television can be seen as examples of what Harvey called 
the “time-space compression” of globalized capitalism, a process that enables nationalism’s 
tendency to universality while at the same time undermining its tendency to particularism, thus 
creating a tension between space and place (1989: 240-241). 
 
An Internet explosion has taken place in recent years in the camps, assisted by transnational 
Palestinian NGO’s such as the Across Borders Project (www.acrossborders.ps), which has set 
up Internet centres in the Burj al-Shemali and Nahr al-Bared camps. There, Palestinian camp 
youth maintain online contacts with their counterparts in the Occupied Territories through 
                                                
62 “Through Children’s Eyes: Children’s Rights in Shatila Camp”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1999. 
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chatrooms, creating transnational and politically defined cyberspaces where images of places in 
Israel and Palestine are exchanged in the form of digital files. Identification with localities is 
expressed by the adding to the name of email addresses the name of the village of origin or the 
number “48” (Khalili 2004: 11). The Internet has brought members of the Palestinian 
“imagined community” closer to one another while simultaneously benefiting concrete forms 
of local identification which are structurally opposed to the homogenizing project of the nation-
state (Appadurai 2003: 338). 
 
The introduction of the Internet and other technologies in the narratives of displaced people 
attests to the fact that imagined communities are increasingly becoming attached to imagined 
places, as refugees gather around remembered or imagined homelands in a world that seems to 
deny such firm territorial anchors (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 39). Paradoxically, 60 years after 
the Nakbah, Palestine seems closer to the new generations of camp residents than it was for the 
jeel al-Filastin, the generation that was expelled. 
 
 
 
7.  The Palestinian Refugees of Lebanon as Part of a Diaspora 
 
Are the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon part of a Palestinian Diaspora? This is a politically 
charged question, tied to the debate about the Right of Return. Every diasporic dimension 
involves a homeland and possibly a homecoming. A great deal of anthropological diaspora 
research uses Safran’s working definition to classify a diaspora as such. For Safran, a diaspora 
is an expatriate minority community whose members and their ancestors have been dispersed 
from an original “center” to two or more “peripheral” regions, who retain a collective memory 
or vision about their homeland, who believe that they are not – and will never be – accepted by 
their host society, who regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the 
place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return when conditions 
are appropriate, who believe that they should collectively be committed to the maintenance or 
restoration of  their original homeland and its safety and prosperity, and whose group solidarity 
is defined by this special relationship to the homeland.  (1999: 365). 
 
Taking these criteria into account, Safran names among others the Palestinians as an example 
of a diaspora although he later asserts that no example confirms the “ideal type” of the Jewish 
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Diaspora. Clifford has shown that the application of the term “diaspora” in Safran´s sense does 
not fully conform to the Jewish case and names examples of a thriving and cosmopolitan 
Jewish diaspora life, particularly in the Muslim world before 1492, as evidence, thus 
questioning the desire to return to the homeland as essential (1999: 218). Indeed, it is important 
to transcend the victim tradition which is located at the heart of any definition of the concept, 
as in many cases – Jewish, Armenian, Lebanese and even Palestinian – living among Others 
resulted in cultural achievements that would not have been possible in the home country (R. 
Cohen 1999: 272).  
 
Safran’s definition is also weakened by its lack of a materialist perspective: Do unemployed 
camp Palestinians in Lebanon, for example, feel the same connection to Palestine as middle-
class Palestinians residing in Europe or America? After all, the strength and viability of an 
ethnic identity away from a homeland are often determined by the economic interests and the 
class position of individuals (Patterson 1999: 605). This is not to say that non-camp 
Palestinians of non-peasant origins are sentimentally detached from their homeland, but rather 
that their experience of exile is qualitatively different; migration and exile may be as much 
about cognitive movement as they are about the actual physical movement of groups and 
individuals from one locality to another (Dawson and Johnson 2001: 319). The author Ghada 
Karmi, after decades of exile in Britain, shares through her autobiography her experience of 
returning to her Jerusalem home from which she had to flee as a child in the following way: 
There was nothing to which I could attach my longing for home. This was not my 
house… I had a sense of frustrated hopelessness. Floatsam and jetsam, I thought, that’s 
how we ended up, not a stick or stone to mark our existence. No homeland, no reference 
point, only a fragile, diplaced and misfit Arab family in England to take on those crucial 
roles. (2002: 445) 
 
On the other hand, a camp woman who had the rare opportunity to visit her native home in 
what is now Israel, described her experience in a different light: 
I still knew it even though it looked different. I remembered where certain houses were 
and were some of the fields… As I left, I lamented that I wished I still lived here… (Um 
´Omar, refugee, quoted in Peteet 2005: 213)63 
 
                                                
63 The home was inhabited by a Yemeni Jewish woman who looked after it and connected with Um ´Omar due to 
their common narratives of displacement. Interestingly, this phenomenon was revealed in other situations such as in 
Cyprus in 2003, when the opening of the demarcation line lead to visits of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot refugees to 
their ancestral homes. 
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Yet the most problematic aspect of Safran’s thesis is his likening of the Palestinians’ situation 
to that of the Sudeten and Silesian Germans, expelled from Czechoslovakia and Poland after 
World War II, and settled in the Federal Republic of Germany. Like the Germans – Safran’s 
argument goes – the Palestinians did not have to make cultural and linguistic sacrifices as they 
were living within the boundaries of the Arab nation (1999: 368). Regarding the Sudeten and 
Silesian Germans, it suffices here to say that their treatment in the Federal Republic simply 
does not bare comparison to the historic circumstances and the hardships experienced by 
Palestinian refugees in the case of sectarian-based state of Lebanon. What distinguishes the 
Palestinians from the Other is their statelessness64, in a world where citizenship denotes basic 
(if not limitless) protection from external threat through legal, political, diplomatic, and if, need 
be, military means. The Palestinian identity manifests itself in places, such as airports, borders 
and checkpoints, where citizenship is checked and verified (R. Khalidi 1997: 1). The author 
Fawaz Turki, who grew up in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, explains: 
I get off the plane at Frankfurt. I have no visa. Only my stateless travel document. ‘You 
have no visa. You can’t enter the country’, I am told by the immigration officer. ‘You are 
stateless; a visa is necessary’. Help me man, ignore my little document of disgrace… 
(1972: 93, quoted in Lindholm Schulz 2003: 89) 
  
Having no state is evidence of vulnerability to harassment. Out of demographic concerns for 
example, Lebanon expelled Palestinian refugees to Jordan in the early 1990s (Shiblak 1996: 
40). Libya also expelled Palestinians with Lebanese residency documents, allegedly to make 
apparent to the international community the dysfunction of the Oslo agreement. Lebanon 
refused their reentry to the country, sparking a crisis that left many stranded at border 
checkpoints and aboard ships (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 91). 
 
Despite the unifying element of statelessness, it would be wrong to speak of the Palestinian 
Diaspora as if it were a homogenous block. Like its Afro-Carribean counterpart, Palestinian 
diasporic identity is marked by continuity as well as difference. While retaining continuity, in 
the Palestinian case through statelessness, the diasporic community is divided by boundaries of 
difference that are continually repositioned in relation to different points of reference (Hall 
1999: 304). Difference is thus created by the individual and collective rights Palestinians may 
or may not enjoy in the states of their residence. Furthermore, the degree of attachment to a 
place of origin is also subject to the position of a community in the social hierarchy both at 
                                                
64 Palestinians with the citizenships of other countries may also feel this sense of statelessness, as do for example 
Kurds with Turkish or Iraqi citizenship, although those merely possessing UNRWA documents are the ones worst 
affected in their daily lives.  
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home and in exile. With this in mind, it can be argued that rural Palestinians who became 
refugees in Lebanon have the strongest desire to return to their homeland. Being directly 
attached to the landscape, due to its function as the source of their livelihood, was the 
motivating force behind the return aspirations of the first generation, the jeel al-Nakbah. Being 
marginalized from society was and remains the foremost reason for passing on this association 
to the next generations. 
 
7.1.  Perspectives on the Right of Return 
 
7.1.1.  The Palestinian perspective 
For the Palestinians, the Right of Return (haq al-awda) is nonnegotiable, as they firmly insist 
on the implementation of UN Resolution 194. However, there exists no clear definition of what 
this Right of Return entails. It is perceived mostly as an abstract moral issue – Its 
acknowledgement implies recognition that the Palestinians are a people with national rights, 
including that of living in their ancestral homeland. Its rejection is understood as a denial of the 
Palestinians’ attachment to their homeland and of the injustices they have suffered since 1948 
(R. Khalidi 1992: 31-2). 
 
Over the years, the PLO has shifted away from an “absolute” Right of Return, as a result of a 
military liberation of Palestine, to the provisions of Resolution 194, which offers compensation 
as an alternative to those who do not wish to return. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations 
between Israel and the PNA on the issue of return, priority is to be given to the Palestinians in 
Lebanon, as they have suffered the most, and because of their contribution in the construction 
of the PLO’s state-like structures of in exile, whose successor the PNA is (ibid.: 36-38). 
However, a possible return of the Lebanon-based refugees – mostly originating from Galilee – 
to a future Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza is inconceivable for most, as 
less than 1 percent of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have any family connections there 
(Brynen 1997: 48). 
 
The possibility of resettlement or towteen is one feared by both Palestinians and Lebanese. At 
times of negotiations between the PNA and Israel this fear is strongly expressed. But the 
Palestinians in Lebanon fear deeper still that the Right of Return will never become a point of 
serious negotiations. The Lebanese of all sects oppose resettlement on various grounds – either 
because they sympathize with the Palestinians or because they wish no disturbance of the 
sectarian status quo (R. Sayigh 1995:  45).  
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7.1.2.  The Israeli perspective 
As argued in Chapter 3, the belief that the Palestinians did not “exist” was for years a major 
pillar of Israeli policy. Although Israel has since de jure recognized the Palestinians, the 
prospect of an eventual return of the Palestinian refugees remains an anathema. Higher Arab 
birth rates could lead to a situation where Israeli Jews could find themselves in a minority, thus 
putting under question the entire rationale behind the project of founding a Jewish state. Many 
in Israel maintain that the problem would have been solved by now, had the Arab governments 
integrated the refugees (Shiblak 1996: 36-37). This however, absolves the state of Israel from 
its responsibility in the creation of the refugee problem. Shimon Peres described the Right of 
Return as: 
a maximalist claim; if accepted, it would wipe out the national character of the State of 
Israel, making the Jewish majority into a minority. Consequently, there is no chance that 
it will be accepted, either now or in the future. (quoted in Brynen 1997: 42) 
 
The reason for this explicit rejection of Palestinian return lies in the European Jewish 
experience of finding itself in the position of a religious minority in a hostile Christianized 
West – an experience that ranged from marginalization to persecution, culminating in the 
horrors of the Holocaust. The possibility of coexistence with the Arabs in Palestine is thus 
dwarfed by the experiences of the past (Dumper 2007: 5). To even contemplate providing a 
formula for the solution of such a complex issue as the Palestinian refugees’ right to return 
would be utopian. However, it can be said with a fair degree of confidence that the persecution 
of the Jews was not solely the outcome of their minority status within European societies 
(although it certainly did contribute to their vulnerability). It can be attributed to a number of 
social factors. To mention only two, the Christian anti-Semitism of the ruling elites of those 
societies, which historically prevented Jews from integrating while assigning them a position 
similar to that of the Southeast Asian Chinese – both the “middlemen” and scapegoats –, and 
the fusion of traditional anti-Semitic prejudices with the evolutionary racism of the late 19th 
century that resulted in Nazism and the Holocaust.  
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8.  Conclusion 
 
The Palestinian refugee issue has its roots in the conflict between the Zionist project and the 
indigenous Palestinian population. Zionism is the last European project of nation-state 
formation. Because it aspired to establish a state in a foreign country it was essentially a 
colonization project. Present day Israel continues to pursue colonization policies in the form of 
further settlement creation in the West Bank, the denial of national rights to the Israeli 
Palestinian minority, and the implementation of the Law of Return. Like the United States and 
Australia earlier and unlike South Africa under the Apartheid, Israel constitutes a non-
exploitative, exclusionist example of colonization. The labour of the indigenous Palestinian 
population remains – whenever the situations allow it – deliberately unutilized. In order to 
achieve a unified identity among the ex-Diaspora settler Jews, Zionism developed a 
sophisticated landscape discourse, based on the Biblical tradition and the desire for personal 
and spiritual renewal. A resurgent landscape was meant to symbolize a resurgent national 
identity. 
 
Due to political fragmentation and the divide between the urban elite and the rural majority, the 
Palestinians were unable to resist the expropriation of their land. By 1948 Israel “bloomed” on 
the land deserted by the Palestinians in the Nakbah. Modern Palestinian nationalism largely 
developed in exile. As in all other nationalist mythologies, the homogeneity and continuity of 
the Palestinian community is imagined. The PLO, as a predominantly middle-class movement, 
only reluctantly mobilized the mass of the rural Palestinian peasants, who were to become – by 
and large – urbanized refugees. The social composition and political orientation of the PLO are 
evidenced by its own landscape discourse, which resembles its European Romantic nationalist 
and Zionist counterparts. Here the peasant is reconstructed from a social agent into a national 
signifier. 
 
The refugees who fled to Lebanon found themselves in a country defined by sectarian 
divisions, epitomized by the marginalization of the Muslim majority vis-à-vis the 
predominantly Christian establishment. The camps became places of containment and 
surveillance. The refugees were the recipients of UNRWA services, which, in an era of 
modernization and decolonization in the Third World, acted as a transforming agent in their 
lives. The UNRWA acted as a substitute to state authorities in the areas of health, education 
and social security. Ultimately, it contributed to the spread of a nationalist consciousness 
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amongst the subsequent generations of refugees. Bearing vivid memories of pre-1948 Palestine, 
the first generations of refugees tried to reconstruct their pre-exile cognitive boundaries through 
the preservation of traditional structures and stereotypes.  
 
The beginning of the Thawra period altered Palestinian perceptions of space and place. While 
maintaining the desire to return, the refugees also felt empowered by the new spatial freedom 
of the camps. These evolved into autonomous spaces of state-formation through the 
establishment of institutions and services that complemented or replaced those of UNRWA. 
The blurring of the camps’ boundaries also symbolized the establishment of solidarity relations 
between Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese poor, predominantly of Shia origin. While still 
greatly influenced by traditional nationalist discourse, Palestinian national identity was 
increasingly being shaped by the universal element of struggle; boosted by the absence of a 
Palestinian landscape as an everyday experience and through heightened politicization. Terms 
such as “revolutionary” or “returnee” challenged the status of the refugees as the passive 
subjects of humanitarian missions. 
 
For women, the Thawra signified the loosening of patriarchal structures. This emancipatory 
development was, however, conditioned by the requirements of an armed struggle directed by 
male-dominated organizations, whose views on warfare were mixed with perceptions of it as a 
male ritual of passage, as well as notions of restoring the honour lost along with the land. 
 
The eviction of the PLO from Beirut in 1982 marked the beginning of renewed confinement 
and vulnerability for camp refugees. They were once more exposed to attack, as exemplified by 
the destruction of the camps’ perimeters during the War of the Camps and the Sabra and 
Shatila massacre. These tragic developments led to new forms of identification and the 
development of social networks among the survivors. The increasing isolation of the refugees 
from their host environment, as well as from on another, also led to the emergence of a “moral 
community”. Distinction from the host community was now achieved through perceived 
superior moral qualities.  
 
The landscape of the camps today is dominated by a culture of commemoration, as expressed 
through the proliferation of monuments and tombs. Commemoration practices reveal the 
presence of different narratives within the Palestinian community. While official nationalist 
narratives celebrate martyrdom as heroic sacrifice for the good of the nation, grass-roots 
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narratives emphasize the aspect of suffering. This allows to compete in the global arena of  
humanitarian discourse, but also to claim membership in the official nation-building process 
from which the camp Palestinians feel excluded. The decline of secular Palestinian nationalism 
partly opened the way to Islamist politics, evident in burial rituals, but also to grass-roots 
practices of remembering, as through publishing popular ethnographies of Palestinian villages. 
This localist perspective has been further strengthened by two recent events: The departure of 
Israel from southern Lebanon, which brought Palestine “closer”, and the widespread use of the 
Internet, which enables the formation of “direct” personal contacts with Palestine. 
 
The Palestinians in Lebanon are part of the wider Palestinian Diaspora. Yet a diaspora is not to 
be perceived as a homogenous body. The degree of attachment to the homeland exhibited by its 
members depends on such factors as social status and the treatment received from the host 
society. Because the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were peasants who relied completely on 
the land for their livelihood, the element of landscape constituted a concrete reality, as opposed 
to its abstract usage in nationalist discourse. This fact, combined with the marginalization of 
the refugees in the camps of Lebanon, makes these refugees preserve a strong desire for return.  
 
The State of Israel categorically refuses to grant the Right of Return to the refugees on grounds 
of demographic concerns. This right however, is nonegotiable for the Palestinians. Their 
demand for its implementation is not merely one of a practical nature and does not necessarily 
derive from the assumed legitimacy of a nationalist ideology and its landscape discourse - It 
constitutes an existential matter of fundamental justice. 
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9.  Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 1: Location and status of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (1999) 
Source: Al Mashriq website 
(http://almashriq.hiof.no/base/refugees.html) 
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Image 2: Entrance to mass grave in Shatila, built by a nearby Hizbullah-controlled municipality  
Source: Palestine Remembered website 
(http://www.palestineremembered.com/GeoPoints/Shatila_R_C__2671/#Pictures) 
 
 
 
 
Image 3: Quotidian memorial site in Burj al Barjaneh where women died in the War of the 
Camps in their attempt to bring supplies into the camp 
Source: Palestine Remembered website 
(http://www.palestineremembered.com/GeoPoints/Burj_al_Barajneih_R_C__2672/#Pictures) 
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Image 4: The BO18 nightclub, built on the site of the Karantina slum, razed to the ground in 
1976 by Phalangist militiamen. Estimated casualties: 1,000 to 1,500 Palestinian refugees.  
Source: Bernard Khoury 
(http://www.bernardkhoury.com/projectDetails.aspx?ID=127) 
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